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ABSTRACT
Modern storage systems continue to increase in scale and complexity as they attempt to
meet the increasing storage needs of our society. Additionally, increased requirements to
comply with government regulation and consumer expectations have increased the need to
make data more available and reliable for longer periods of time. The design of modern and
next-generation storage systems is a difficult task that requires high storage capacity and
efficiency while also maintaining the data integrity.
The rapid advancement of storage system technologies brings with it a level of uncertainty
as to the fitness of new designs and methods for meeting the complex requirements. New
technologies, like deduplication, promise improved storage efficiency, but their impact on
reliability measures is unclear due to the complex relationships inherent to the systems
that employ these technologies. Additionally, as systems scale up, they become subject to
faults and errors that previous-generation systems may never have encountered due to the
rare nature of these faults. Because of the stiffness of the represented systems, and the
complex relationships involved, it can be difficult to analyze these environments correctly
and efficiently.
In this dissertation, we propose a method to analyze storage system reliability by us-
ing component-based models coupled with realistic fault models. We solve these complex
systems by identifying fault, fault propagation, and mitigation events; by identifying de-
pendence relationships between state variables, events, and rewards; and by decomposing
our model at various points during model solution to improve the efficiency of our solution
while maintaining the correctness of our reward measures. In particular, we discuss build-
ing scalable component-based models of large-scale systems that employ modern reliability
methods, such as RAID, and state-of-the-art storage efficiency methods such as dedupli-
ii
cation. We present detailed fault models for these systems, including a novel model for
undetected disk errors. To enable efficient solution of these models we propose a method to
analyze the dependence relationships that underlie storage systems and propose a way to
solve these models by identifying and exploiting these relationships when solving for reliabil-
ity measures. We apply our methods to real-world systems, detail the consequences for the
reliability of deduplication, and suggest and evaluate methods to improve reliability while
still maintaining improved storage efficiency.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Modern storage systems have become increasingly large, both because of the growth of user
data, and the advent of new regulations concerning the length of time data must be kept.
As storage systems have increased in size, failures have become increasingly common, and
faults which once were rare enough to be ignored as improbable have become threats to
data integrity. As systems and needs evolve, so do reliability goals, and technologies that
once provided suitable reliability may need to be re-examined. To better understand the
challenges and requirements of evolving storage systems before production and deployment,
and to understand the costs and trade offs necessitated by alternative system configurations,
methods must be adapted to evaluate and assess proposed designs.
Part of the process of evaluating proposed storage systems is the development of a complete
understanding of the environment in which the system operates, interactions within the
system, and the nature of the technologies employed by the system to achieve reliability
goals and storage efficiency goals. Recent years have seen rapid development along these
lines, especially in response to recent legislation mandating the length of time data must be
stored for retrieval. In 2002, over five exabytes of data were produced [2], representing an
increase of 30% from 2001. By 2007 the figure had increased to 281 exabytes, 10% more
than expected because of faster growth in cameras, digital TV shipments, and other media
sectors [1]. In 2010, the total data produced passed the zettabyte barrier. Forecasts put the
total size of stored data for 2011 at 10 times the size for 2006, roughly 1.8 zettabytes [3].
Storing the data has become increasingly problematic. In 2007, as forecast, the amount of
data created exceeded available storage for the first time [1].
Part of the driving force behind those changes has been the more than 10,000 legal reg-
ulations enacted in the U.S. alone [4]. In 2003, the amount of data stored for compliance
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Figure 1.1: Percent of total data that requires high reliability due to security, compliance,
or preservation requirements [1].
reasons increased by 63% [5]. What makes those increases particularly significant is that
they took place before the most demanding regulations, such as Sarbanes-Oxley, went into
effect. Furthermore, digital storage is also being impacted by the shift to digital storage of
permanent records. As shown in Figure 1.1, an increasing amount of data is subject to high
reliability requirements due to security, compliance, or preservation-related goals.
It is not enough, however, to simply have a large, reliable storage system. Despite the
decreasing cost of COTS storage devices, the cost of managed disk-based storage is still
high. These costs usually represent more than just the cost of the physical hardware it-
self. Enterprise-class storage has proven to be too expensive for many uses, creating an
environment in which less expensive near-line drives are used for archival purposes [6].
Additional pressure on storage systems is being created by the expanding availability and
reliance on cloud-based applications and resources. Web services such as e-mail, archives,
photo sharing, and social networks require that large volumes of user data be stored indef-
initely. In order for these services to remain economically viable to their operators, they
must have access to low-cost storage that remains reliable and available for their customers.
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To enable increased scalability for primary and archival storage systems new methods are
being developed to improve storage efficiency, allowing a larger data set to be stored in less
space by eliminating redundancy. Due to the increasing size requirements of archival stor-
age, many system administrators are choosing to deploy these increased-efficiency systems
without fully understanding the reliability consequences.
The key challenges addressed by this dissertation are as follows:
• Developing a robust understanding of current storage systems currently deployed, and
being developed. This includes an understanding of the underlying system models,
including the current storage requirements, technologies for improving storage effi-
ciency and reliability, and the faults these systems face in production systems and
next-generation systems currently being designed.
• Creating new fault models for emerging faults faced by modern and next-generation
storage systems based on the analysis of real data from production systems, and the
previous literature. This includes models of fault interaction, and mitigation techniques
so that a rich fault environment can be appropriately simulated.
• Analyzing and developing new models for storage data, its placement on production
file systems, and how the characteristics of that data can be used to better understand
the impact of system designs, and to develop new techniques to improve reliability and
storage efficiency of storage systems under development to enable intelligent design
decisions.
• Creation of new techniques to improve the efficiency and correctness of our analysis,
specifically aimed at confronting the challenges presented by the rare nature of certain
important faults in modern storage systems.
• The development of new reliability infrastructures designed to provide storage systems
which meet specified reliability goals while maintaining a high level of storage efficiency.
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1.1 Thesis Statement
There exists a need for methods that allow for the simulation of complex storage systems
with complex dependence relationships, accounting for wide classes of faults in order to
design and plan for next-generation systems to meet goals for storage system reliability and
efficiency.
It is our thesis that by combining component level models of storage system hardware,
with empirically derived models of data dependence relationships, we can efficiently calculate
measures of reliability for the systems in a rich environment of faults, and provide real
solutions for achieving both reliability and storage efficiency goals.
To achieve this goal we must:
• Develop an understanding of the faults affecting not only the current generation of
storage systems, but also those that will be important in next-generation systems.
• Develop an understanding of the technologies which will be employed by next-generation
systems, such as deduplication.
• Understand the complex dependence relationships in modern storage systems which
arise from RAID, and deduplication.
• Exploit the structure of the underlying models to improve efficiency of solution of stiff
models, given the wide range of rates implied by large-scale systems with rare-errors
and fast I/O.
• Illustrate the use of the developed methods on a real system, using component-based
methods.
• Propose methods for improving the reliability of large-scale storage systems, while
maintaining some improvements to storage-efficiency.
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1.2 Related Work
We now discuss work related to this dissertation. While we will discuss related work more
specific to our methods in each chapter to provide the context for the contributions of each
chapter, we discuss here some work of general interest to our motivation.
1.2.1 Modeling Disk Faults
Magnetic storage have become remarkably reliable devices since their inception, despite
their complexity. Both near-line and enterprise drives often implement the ability to detect
and recover from many types of errors automatically. Faulty portions of a platter can be
remapped to different logical and physical portions of the disk, and disks can often correctly
report when their data is no longer readable. Manufacturers provide reliability parameters
for their disks, such as mean time to failure (MTTF), and many studies exist which detail
the failure rates of drives in practice [7, 8, 9]. In addition to traditional, whole disk failure,
work has been done in the literature detailing other types of failures which result in the loss
of individual sectors [10, 9].
While these fault models characterize many types of faults, they do not appear to be
sufficient to estimate the reliability of large scale systems. IBM/LLNL’s ASCI White with
only 8192 cores, realized a MTTF of only 40 hours [11], much lower than expected from
traditional fault models. While RAID was sufficient in the past to tolerate faults [12], faults
which are unaddressed by RAID have been documented [13]. To assess the reliability of
modern storage systems, more detailed models of observed faults are required.
1.2.2 The Impact of Modern Storage Technologies on Reliability
In order to reduce the footprint of backup and archival storage, system architects have
begun using a new method to improve storage efficiency, called data deduplication. At a
high level, data deduplication is a method for eliminating redundant data in a storage system
to improve storage efficiency. Sub-file segments are fingerprinted and compared to a data
base of identified segments to find duplicate data. Duplicate data is then replaced with
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references to the stored instances. Recently this technology has also become available for
near-line primary storage controllers. These same methods are also being used to diminish
the silos between primary and archival storage for scale-out file systems. With the increasing
prominence of cloud computing, providers are also actively evaluating deduplication as a
method to decrease costs when supplying cloud storage products to customers.
The literature provides a good understanding on the cost of deduplication in terms of
performance [14, 15]. Reliability studies have been much fewer in number. Since traditional
deduplication keeps only a single instance of redundant data, deduplication has the poten-
tial to magnify the negative impact of losing a data chunk in chunk-based deduplication
[16, 5] that divides a file into multiple chunks, or of missing a file in deduplication using
delta encoding [17, 18, 19, 20, 21] that stores the differences among files. However, due to
the smaller number of disks required to store deduplicated data, it also has the potential to
improve reliability as well. Administrators and system architects have found understanding
the data reliability of their system under deduplication to be important but extremely diffi-
cult [22]. A related question is estimating if a data reliability constraint for files associated
with a business critical application (such as database) will be violated if data deduplication
is employed.
Existing literature on the reliability of deduplication is hindered by a reliance on heuristics
– the key recommendation is to keep multiple copies of a data chunk instead of storing only
a single instance. Deep Store [5] proposed to determine the level of redundancy for a chunk
based on a user-assigned value of importance. D. Bhagwat et al. [16] suggested that the
number of replicas for a chunk should be proportional to its reference count, i.e., the number
of files sharing the chunk. A gap exists in the current literature on the topic of quantifying
the data reliability of a deduplication system or providing a means to estimate whether a
set of reliability requirements can be met in a deduplication system.
1.3 Contributions
The contributions of this dissertation are as follows:
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• A model for an emerging class of faults, undetected disk errors (UDEs), derived from
real data and an analysis of how UDEs interact with existing reliability methods which
cause them to be both orthogonal to these methods, and to interact to propagate faults
to the parity section of RAID groups.
• A model of data deduplication, analyzing the dependence relationships implied by data
deduplication in a real system, and the complex ways in which deduplication can affect
both reliability and storage efficiency of the entire disk, and file categories on the disk
itself. We show via our model and analysis that such category specific information is
important both to understand the impact of deduplication, but also to form efficient
strategies for improving reliability of the underlying storage system without completely
compromising the storage efficiency benefits.
• A method for analyzing dependence relationships in storage system models. This
includes a method to represent the system model as a Model Dependency Graph
(MDG), a data structure which encodes all direct and indirect dependence relationships
as paths through the graph traversing state variables and events.
• A method for simulating systems with constructed MDGs. This new method attempts
to improve performance by decomposing the underlying model based on the current
values of all state variables, and the information encoded in the MDG, splitting the
model into separated sub-models which can be analyzed independently until the next
rare event.
• Experimental results to show the use of our methods on real production systems and
data, demonstrating their utility for analyzing real world systems.
• A case study of a production archival storage system to show how reliability goals can
be defined, system fitness for these goals can be evaluated, and how system models
can be altered to meet the stated reliability goals.
• Novel reliability frameworks which can be used with deduplicated storage systems to
provide additional reliability while increasing storage efficiency as well as methods to
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protect against faults which were orthogonal to previous reliability methods.
1.4 Organization
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.
Chapter 3 details the important faults facing modern and next-generation storage systems.
We detail models for traditional disk failure, latent sector errors (LSEs), and develop new
models for UDEs. We study the ways in which these faults can impact storage systems,
the reasons the occur in real physical systems, and how they manifest when they occur. In
addition to studying the faults themselves we address the way these faults are mitigated
in production systems, and develop models of both the detection and recovery phases of
mitigation for each of our fault models.
Chapter 2 details the creation of models for storage systems. In particular it introduces a
component based modeling method which focuses on building, validating, and using models
of individual components to enable scalability analysis, while giving some confidence in
models of systems have not yet been built. We analyze an existing system in production at
the National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) for our analysis.
Chapter 4 details the creation of fault models specific to our studied system, and introduces
the idea of decomposition as a method for handling rare events and the stiffness which results
from their introduction to our models.
Chapter 5 introduces the concept of a MDG. We begin by discussing the ways in which
dependencies can occur within a model, their importance to our decomposition methods,
and an algorithm for creating an MDG from a model. We then discuss the decomposition
procedure, beginning with an analysis of the types of rare events which can change the
dependence relationships represented in the MDG. We detail a method for modifying the
MDG to represent the current dependence relationships and define a decomposed set of sub-
models. We then discuss how to use these techniques to solve a model, and the limitations
of our solution method.
In Chapter 6 we study a real deduplicated storage system, enabling us to develop a model of
deduplication, expanding the models developed in Chapters 2 and 4. We present the results
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of this study and develop a full model for an entire production system, solving the model
and analyzing the impact of deduplication, and various proposed strategies for reliability
using the techniques presented in 5.
Finally, in Chapter 7 we discuss the consequences of our studies for real systems and
formally present novel methods for improving the reliability of primary and secondary storage
systems, including the ability to tolerate UDEs, faults that previously had no acceptable
means for tolerance.
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CHAPTER 2
COMPONENT-BASED MODELS
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we address the problem of building large scalable models of systems. One
challenge that we tackle is that of developing models that can be trusted to adequately
represent next-generation systems that have not yet been built. We approach that goal
by developing component-based models based on current systems, validating these models
against log data for current systems, and then constructing larger-scale models using these
components. We present such an approach in this chapter, showing the results of scaling a
component-based model of the Abe cluster [23] to petascale. We will use this method for
component-based modeling in Chapters 4 and 6 when building models of next-generation
systems.
Our results in this chapter emphasize the importance of developing a detailed model of
the underlying system based on real data. The failure rates we observed in the real system
differed from those presented in the manufacturer data sheets. Software faults due to the
corrupted applications or the Lustre file system were responsible for many errors and had a
repair time that was significantly less than hardware errors. Without detailed study of the
underlying system, these important factors would have been unaccounted for, resulting in
an incorrect analysis of our next-generation system.
2.2 Motivation
Historically, scientific computing has driven large-scale computing resources to their limits.
In the last decade, plans to achieve petascale computing have come to fruition. While
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supercomputer performance has improved by over two orders of magnitude every decade, the
performance gap between the individual nodes and the overall processing ability of an entire
system has widened drastically [24]. This has led to a shift in the paradigm of supercomputer
design, from a centralized approach to a distributed one that supports heterogeneity. While
most high-performance computing environments require parallel file systems, there have
been several file systems, such as GPFS [25], PVFS2 [26], and Lustre [27], that have been
specifically proposed to support very large-scale scientific computing environments.
As the number of individual computing resources and components becomes very large,
the frequency of failure of components within these clusters and the propagation of these
failures to other resources are important concerns to high-performance computing applica-
tions. Failures can be caused by many factors: (a) transient hardware faults due to increased
chip density, (b) software error propagation due to a large buggy legacy code base, or (c)
manufacturing defects and environmental factors such as temperature or humidity.
Recent literature on failure analysis of BlueGene/L discusses various causes of increased
downtime of supercomputers [28]. It has been well-established that elimination of failures
is impossible; it is only feasible to circumvent failures and to mitigate their effects on a
system’s performance. The standard approach to the mitigation of a failure is to checkpoint
the application at regular intervals. Long et al., however, showed that check-pointing has
a large impact on the performance of very large computer clusters with large numbers of
nodes [29].
Increasing the number of compute servers in a cluster almost always increases the size of
the desired storage subsystem. Depending on the type of parallel file system, that means an
increase in the number of file servers that could accept requests from the compute servers to
keep up with I/O requests. Compute servers and file servers have very different characteris-
tics. First, a failure in a file server needs more attention than a failure in a compute node.
A compute server might just be marked as unavailable until it is repaired, but a failed file
server might have to be reconstructed, or its state might need to be transferred to another
file server, depending on the replication strategy. Second, file servers are inherently slower
than compute servers due to their I/O characteristics. This generally makes file servers the
bottleneck for the reliability and performance of a cluster. Unfortunately, there has been a
11
trend towards increasing failure rates for I/O subsystems that is similar to that for overall
petascale clusters. This increase in failures can be attributed to the increase in the number
of individual components that are used to build the whole I/O subsystem . Recent studies
have shown that workload intensity is highly correlated to the failure rates [30, 31]. That
emphasizes the need for thorough analysis to understand the impact of the I/O subsystems
and their failures on petascale computers.
To address the research challenge of providing realistic prediction of petascale file system
availability, we took a two-pronged approach. First, we have obtained the failure event
log of the Abe cluster from the NCSA. The log contains the failures of individual nodes,
file server nodes, and the storage area network (SAN). We preprocessed the event logs to
determine various reward measures of interest corresponding to the file system, such as the
availability of the file system over the lifetime of the log and the failure rate of jobs due to
I/O failures and other transient failures. Then, we built and refined stochastic models of the
file system used by these clusters that abstracts much of the operations, while generating
reward measures that are comparable to the real log events. We then scaled the models to
reflect the scale and magnitude of a future petascale computer and estimated the impact
of current I/O and file system designs on a petascale computer. Furthermore, we evaluated
strategies that could be used to mitigate the bottlenecks due to scaling of I/O file system
and cluster designs from current supercomputers to petascale computers. Our analysis will
give storage architects support to make informed design choices as they build larger cluster
file systems.
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.3 outlines related work. Sec-
tion 2.4 discusses the file system architecture of the Abe cluster at NCSA with the analysis
of collected failure log files. Section 2.5 presents the conceptual stochastic activity network
model of the Abe cluster. Section 2.6 covers results and analysis. Section 2.7 offers our
conclusions and plans for future work.
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2.3 Related Work
The estimation and prediction of the failure of file systems are crucial to understanding the
overall performance of petascale computers. Past literature describes several attempts to
model and analyze different aspects of large-scale supercomputing systems.
Log/trace-based analysis: Recent literature using trace-based system analysis has
shown that storage subsystems are prone to higher failure rates than their makers estimate
because of underrepresented disk infant mortality rates [32]. In addition to disk failures, the
analysis by Jiang et al. shows that interconnects and protocol stacks play a significant role in
storage subsystem failure [33]. Furthermore, Liang et al. investigated the failure events from
the event logs from BlueGene/L to develop failure prediction models to anticipate future
fatal failures [28]. In general, trace-based analysis of logs provide good metrics for evaluat-
ing and understanding working systems, but is limited to the scope of events represented by
these traces, making it difficult to study trends or behaviors not witnessed in the traces.
Model-based analysis: Wang et al. looked at the impact on system performance in
the presence of correlated failures as the systems are scaled to several hundred thousand
processors [29]. Rosti et al. presented a formal model to capture CPU and I/O interactions
in scientific applications, to characterize system performance [34].
The use of simulation for evaluating the model provides the ability to predict behavior
and bottlenecks of future designs, but the accuracy of predictions may often be compro-
mised by assumptions of parameter values. Our approach focuses on integrating trace based
analysis with model-based evaluation to form a combined approach, providing guidance to
make informed choices for system design. Using failure data from the logs of the cluster as
parameter values, we verify our models against the real system. We then analyze the impact
of current design choices when the system is scaled. Our approach reduces the burden of
sensitivity analysis, reducing the design space to a moderate size providing the opportunity
to perform a robust analysis of the system.
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2.4 Abe Cluster: System Configuration and Log File Analysis
The Abe cluster architecture was the current state-of-the-art as of 2008. Abe consists of
1200 blade compute nodes, i.e., 9600 core CPU Intel 64 (2.33 GHz dual-socket quad-core)
processors, 8/16 GB shared RAM per node, and an InfiniBand (IB) interface. The cluster
runs Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4 (Linux 2.6.9) as its operating system. The cluster can
provide a peak compute performance of 89.47 peta-FLOPS (floating point operations per
second). The Lustre file system supports a 100TB parallel cluster file system for the Abe
cluster’s compute nodes [23].
2.4.1 General Cluster File System (CFS) Architecture
A typical storage architecture for a cluster file system consists of a metadata server, multiple
file servers, and clients [27]. The metadata server maintains the file system’s metadata,
which includes the access control information, mapping of files and directory names to their
locations, and mapping of allocated and free space. The metadata server serves the metadata
to the clients. The file servers maintain the actual data and information about the file
blocks stored on the connected I/O disks and serve these file blocks to the clients. For
reliability/performance, the file blocks can be replicated/striped over multiple disks. The
client communicates first with the metadata server and then with the appropriate file server
to perform the required read and write operation. The readers are referred to [27] for further
details.
2.4.2 Abe CFS Server Hardware
The Abe Lustre-FS is currently supported by 24 Dell dual Xeon servers that provide 12 fail-
over pairs1. One OSS serves the metadata of the Lustre-FS, 8 OSSes serve the /cfs/scratch
OSS, and the remaining 6 servers handle the remaining partitions of the shared file systems
(home, local, usr, etc.) of the cluster. Each server self-monitors its file system’s health. The
2 metadata OSSes are connected to the storage I/O through a dual 2Gb fiber channel (FC).
1We refer to a fail-over pair as an OSS in the remainder of the Chapter.
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2.4.3 Abe CFS Storage Hardware
Scratch partition: 2 S2A9550 storage units from DataDirect Networks Systems provide
the storage hardware for the CFS’s scratch partition. Each S2A9550 supports 8 4Gb FC
ports. Each port connects to 3 tiers of SATA disks. Each tier has (8+2) disks in a RAID6
configuration. Therefore, there are 480 disks, each with a 250GB capacity, that form the
scratch partition providing 96TB of usable space.
Metadata: DDN EF2800 provides the I/O hardware to support the metadata of the
Lustre-FS. It is connected to the 2 metadata OSSes through a dual 2Gb fiber channel. The
EF2800 has one tier of 10 disks in RAID10 configuration.
Other partitions: 10 IBM DS4500s serve an approximate total of 40TB of usable space
over a SAN via a 2Gb FC.
Lustre settings: Lustre version 1.4.10.X runs on all of the OSS’s hardware. Most of
the reliability is provided by the SAN hardware; therefore, the Lustre reliability features are
switched off.
2.4.4 Abe Log Failure Analysis
All NCSA clusters have elaborate logging and monitoring services built into them. The
log data set used in this study was collected from 05/03/2007 to 10/02/2007 for compute
nodes (compute-logs) and from 09/05/2007 to 11/30/2007 for the SAN (SAN-logs). The
compute-logs and SAN-logs are monitored precisely, and the logs provide details about the
events taking place in the cluster. Events are reported with the node IP addresses and the
event times appended to the log information. To extract accurate failure event information,
we filter failure logs based on temporal and causal relationships between events.
Table 2.2 provides the availability of the Abe cluster based on the notifications provided by
the SAN administrators to the users [35]. The availability of Abe’s SAN can be estimated
to be between 0.97 and 0.98 depending on the dates one chooses as the start and end
times for the measure computation. Table 2.1 shows Lustre-FS mount failures experienced
by individual compute nodes aggregated on a per-day basis. Lustre-FS mount failures do
not always imply the failure of the CFS, as these errors could be caused by intermittent
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network unavailability. Nevertheless, those errors are perceived as failures from the cluster’s
perspective.
Table 2.3 presents the job failure/completion statistics obtained by analyzing the compute-
log. The analysis shows that the transient errors causing network unavailability (between
the compute nodes and the CFS or between the compute nodes and the login nodes) are
5 times more likely to cause job failures than other errors are (such as software errors or
CFS failures). Earlier clusters had dedicated back-planes connected to compute nodes to
provide communication. Current communication in Abe is through COTS network ports
and switches. The change in the design choice was motivated chiefly by a desire to lower
costs and increase flexibility in maintaining the system.
Table 2.4 provides the disk failure and replacement log from 09/05/2007 to 11/28/2007 for
disks that support the scratch partition of the Abe’s cluster. The authors of [32] estimated
the disks’ hazard rate function to be statistically equivalent to a Weibull distribution. We
performed similar survival analysis on the disk failure data and found that Weibull with
β = 0.7 was a good fit for Abe’s disk drive failure logs. The key insights we gained from
analyzing failure data and from discussions with cluster system administrators are as follows:
• The disk replication redundancy and replacement have been so well-streamlined that
they almost never cause catastrophic failure of the CFS. On average, 0-2 disks are
replaced on the Abe cluster per week.
• The Abe cluster’s S2A9550 RAID6 (8+2) technology combines the virtues of RAID3,
RAID5, and RAID0 to provide both reliability and performance [36]. RAID6 prevents
a second drive failure from occurring during disk re-mirroring. The Blue Waters peta-
scale computer, which will be built at the University of Illinois, will likely have an
Date # Date # Date #
07/03/07 102 07/19/07 258 08/16/07 375
08/20/07 591 09/05/07 005 09/17/07 002
09/18/07 004 09/19/07 003 09/28/07 463
09/29/07 477 10/01/07 051 10/02/07 035
Table 2.1: Lustre mount failure notification by compute nodes from 07/01/07 to 10/02/07;
column with “#” represents the number of compute nodes that experienced mount failure
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Lustre-FS outage time
Cause of Failure Start time End time Hours
I/O hardware 07/21/07 23:03 07/22/07 12:00 12.95
I/O hardware 07/31/07 01:49 07/31/07 20:01 18.18
I/O hardware 08/22/07 18:08 08/23/07 02:15 08.12
I/O hardware 08/28/07 16:20 08/29/07 18:01 01.67
I/O hardware 09/25/07 18:00 09/26/07 09:30 15.50
I/O hardware 10/04/07 09:30 10/04/07 21:55 12.42
Batch system 10/16/07 17:56 10/16/07 21:24 03.47
Network 10/29/07 11:53 10/29/07 15:15 03.36
File system 11/16/07 09:30 11/16/07 10:00 00.40
File system 11/19/07 09:04 11/19/07 11:00 01.93
Table 2.2: User notification of outage of the Lustre-FS
Total jobs submitted between 05/13/07 and 10/02/07 44085
Total failures due to transient network errors 1234
Total failures due to other/file system errors 0184
Table 2.3: Job execution statistics for the Abe cluster
(8+3) RAID configuration. That would make the failure of the file system due to
multiple individual disk failures highly unlikely.
• Most file system failures are due to software errors, configuration errors, and other
transient errors. The software errors take, on average, 2-4 hours to resolve. Most
often, the fix is to bring the disks to a consistent state using a file system check (fsck).
A hardware failure due to a network component or a RAID controller might take up
to 24 hours to resolve, as these components need to be procured from a vendor.
2.5 Stochastic Activity Network Model: Cluster File System
The failure data analysis and the insights provide the details necessary to build a stochastic
model of the Abe’s cluster file system. Here, we describe the details of the stochastic activity
network models using Mo¨bius [38].
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Dates in September 2007 05 06 09 13 23
Number of failed disks 2 1 1 1 1
Dates in October 2007 08 17 24
Number of failed disks 2 1 1
Dates in November 2007 08 17
Number of failed disks 1 1
Survival analysis of the disk failures (n = 480) using Weibull
regression (in log relative-hazard form) gives the shape parameter as
0.6963571 with standard deviation of 0.1923109 (95% confidence interval) [37]
Table 2.4: Disk failure log from 09/05/2007 to 11/28/2007 for disks supporting the Abe
cluster’s scratch partition
2.5.1 Overall Model
Figure 2.1 shows the composed model of the Abe cluster using replicate/join composition in
Mo¨bius . The leaf nodes in the replicate/join tree are stochastic activity network models that
implement the functionalities. Space limitations do not permit detailed descriptions of these
submodels. The CLUSTER model has two main submodels connected using a join, where
the models share states on error propagation from their CLIENT to the CFS. The CLIENT
represents the behavior and interaction of the compute nodes and the communication net-
work between the compute nodes and the CFS. The CFS UNIT emulates the Abe’s cluster
file system. It is composed of the OSS, OSS SAN NW, SAN, and the DDN UNITS. The
OSS implements the availability and operational model of the metadata server and the file
server. The OSS SAN NW implements the failure model of the network ports and switches
that connect OSS to the DDN UNITS. The SAN emulates the operations provided by the
network to communicate between OSS and the DDN UNITS. The OSS, OSS SAN NW,
SAN, and the DDN UNITS communicate by sharing information about their current state
of operation and availability. The DDN UNITS composes multiple RAID6 UNITS with
RAID CONTROLLER. The failure of disks in RAID6 UNITS is assumed to follow a Weibull
distribution. RAID CONTROLLER emulates the failure and operation of a typical RAID6
architecture. The DDN UNITS is replicated to emulate multiple S2A9550 units.
Since the goal is to investigate the impact of availability of file systems to peta-scale com-
puters, the stochastic activity network models do not consider hardware failure in compute
nodes. Our model incorporates only the behavior of the scratch partition and the meta-
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Figure 2.1: Compositional model of the CFS.
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data servers of the CFS, because a cluster’s utility depends mainly on its scratch partition’s
availability. Finally, hardware and software misconfiguration errors occur in the early de-
ployment phase of the system; therefore, we exclude them from the models. In the following
subsections, we describe the reward measures and the failure model used to represent the
Abe’s CFS.
2.5.2 Reward Measures
The availability of the cluster file system is defined as the ability of the CFS to serve the
client nodes. More precisely, it is defined as the fraction of time when all the file server
nodes (OSSes), the DDN, and the network interconnect between the OSSes and the DDN
are in the working state.
The disk replacement rate is defined as the number of disks that need to be replaced per
unit of time to sustain the maximum availability of the CFS.
The cluster utility, CU, is an availability metric from the cluster’s perspective. To be
precise, it is defined as CU =
(
1− Compute cycles lost due to unavailable file system
Total available compute cycles
)
. CU is a met-
ric that is different from the availability metric of the CFS2. The cluster users and SAN
administrators tend to notice different levels of availability. The reasons are failures in
network communication between the compute nodes and the CFS as well as failures due
to intermittent transient errors that make CFS appear unavailable even though it has not
failed.
2.5.3 Failure Model for Abe’s CFS
The Abe’s cluster suffers from failures mainly because of 3 types of errors: hardware errors,
software errors, and transient errors. Each kind of error affects all the CFS’s components.
The hardware errors in the metadata/file servers (OSSes) occur in the hardware com-
ponents that are built to operate the system. These errors include processor, memory, and
network errors. Hardware errors are assumed to be less frequent than disk failures, occurring
2CU does not distinguish between compute cycles used to perform check-pointing and those used for
actual computation.
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Model parameter Values (range)
Disk MTBF2 100000-3000000
Annualized Failure Rate (AFR) 0.40%–8.6%
Weibull distribution’s shape parameter1 0.6–1.0
Number of DDN1 2–20
Number of compute nodes1 1200–32000
Average time to replace disks3 1–12 hours
Average time to replace hardware3 12–36 hours
Average time to fix software3 2–6 hours
Job request per hour1 12–15 per hour
Hardware failure rate1 1–2 per 720 hours
Software failure rate 1–2 per 720 hours
Annual growth rate of disk capacity2 33%
DDN Units1 2–20
OSS Units1 8–80
Parameter values obtained from: log file analysis 1, data
specification from literature and hardware white papers 2,
discussions with NCSA cluster administrators3
Table 2.5: Abe cluster’s simulation model parameters
at the rate of 1–2 per month. The RAID controllers in the DDN or network ports/switches
that connect DDN to OSS show similar failure rates. The repairs of these components take
12–36 hours depending upon the severity of the failure (as reported by SAN administra-
tors), as the needed replacement parts have to be shipped from the vendors. Most of the
hardware is replicated with fail-over mechanisms. Failure of both members of the fail-over
pair causes the unavailability of the CFS system. The replacement of failed disks is modeled
as a deterministic event. The repair time is varied from 1 to 12 hours across simulation
experiments.
The software errors that cause failure of the cluster file systems are mainly due to the
corrupted supercomputing applications running on the compute nodes (implemented in the
CLIENT submodel) or the Lustre-FS (implemented in the OSS submodel). Since we do not
have accurate estimates on software corruption errors, we assume that the rates are similar
in the orders of magnitude to hardware error rates. The repair times for software errors
are modeled as deterministic events. The repair time is varied from 2 to 6 hours across
simulation experiments.
Transient errors occur in most components of the cluster model, but mainly in the network
components. The error rates are obtained from the failure-log analysis as shown in Table 2.3.
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Transient errors are temporary, but hard to diagnose. Our model assume that one of these
errors causes a few minutes of unavailability of components under transient failure. The jobs
depending on those components fail due to the temporary unavailability.
Past literature has emphasized the importance of modeling correlated failures [31]. Most
correlated errors occur because of shared resources. Correlated errors propagate to compo-
nents that have causal or spatial proximity. In the CFS model, hardware errors propagate
because other hardware components are connected to each other. Software errors propagate
from compute nodes to OSS or from OSS to disk, leading to data corruption. Transient
errors propagate errors into software. All failures except disk failures are modeled as expo-
nential distributions. To model correlated failures, we model jobs and requests submitted to
the CFS, and estimate the probability p that the job requires a resource that is inaccessible
due to failure, causing errors to propagate through the system.
2.6 Experimental Results and Analysis
We evaluate the design of the Abe cluster’s availability using simulation in the Mo¨bius
tool. Table 2.5 summarizes the parameters collected through failure log analysis, hardware
reliability specifications, and discussions with cluster administrators. In order to reflect the
size and scale of a peta-scale computer and to determine the factors that impede the high
availability of the CFS, we scale the number of individual components in the composed
model. By implementing scaling through the addition of components (each of which has its
own individual failure models) rather than by changing failure parameter values themselves,
we ensure that the failure rates observed in the overall system model accurately reflect the
new system size. All the simulation results are reported at a 95% confidence level.
2.6.1 Impact of Disk Failures on CFS
To evaluate the baseline effect of failures of disks on availability of the CFS, we evaluate the
DDN UNITS models associated with the RAID6 tiers and the RAID controllers in isolation
from failures of other components of the SAN. Figure 2.2 shows the availability of the storage
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Figure 2.2: Availability of storage with respect to disk failures; Label with values
(0.7,2.92,8+2,4) represents a tuple =(Weibull shape parameter β, AFR in %, RAID
configuration, average disk replacement time in hours)
hardware as one scales the file system from the current 96TB (Abe’s file system) to 12PB
(the Blue-Waters file system). The key observation is that the RAID6 architecture provides
sufficient redundancy and recovery mechanisms to mitigate the impact of high disk failure
rates to a very large extent. First, note that all configurations of failure and recovery rates
for an Abe-sized cluster file system have nearly 100% availability (refer to the first data point
in Figure 2.2). However, as the experiments are scaled from Abe’s system to a peta-scale
system, our simulation results show that the RAID6 architecture cannot provide the same
level of storage availability for some of the failure model configurations. The SAN architect’s
plan to use (8+3) RAID in Blue Waters is important; it provides better reliability than the
(8+2) RAID on peta-scale systems. While RAID6 provides a larger margin for disk failure
rates, i.e., up to 8.6% AFR, it is very important that these rates be contained to lower
thresholds by disk manufacturers and vendors to provide the adequate level of availability.
If one makes a pessimistic assumption of a higher infant mortality rate in disks (Weibull
shape parameter = 0.6), the availability falls below 99.9% for peta-scale storage.
To better understand the cost of disk replacement, we compute the expected number
of disks that need to be replaced per week for the RAID6 tiers. Figure 2.3 depicts the
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availability
average number of disks that need to be replaced per week to sustain the availability so that
the CFS does not suffer failure due to RAID6 failure. The configuration (0.7,2.92,8+2,4)
corresponds to the Abe cluster with 0 to 2 disk replacements per week. Each time a disk
fails, there is an operational cost (in dollars) that is borne by the SAN vendors as they
provide extended support to their SANs. As the CFS system is scaled to support peta-scale
computers, the number of disks that need to be replaced increases, increasing the labor cost
and the replacement cost. Therefore, the SAN vendors have an incentive to increase the disk
MTBF to reduce their overall support cost.
Survival analysis of the disk failure data provided a good estimate of the Weibull dis-
tribution’s shape parameter β, but the estimate for the scale parameter (MTBF) was in-
significant [37]. Using simulations, we estimated an MTBF that matched the average disk
failures per week for the scratch partition and determined that an MTFF=300,000 hours or
an annualized failure rate (AFR) = 2.92% to be a good fit.
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2.6.2 CFS Availability and CU
To analyze the impact of all components that determine the availability of the CFS, we
evaluated the availability and CU of the Abe system. The experiments are scaled to the size
of a peta-scale computer to allow understanding of the impact of failures on those measures.
Figure 2.4 shows that the CFS availability decreases as one scales the system to support
a peta-scale computer. Since most of the parameter values were obtained through the log
data analysis and times reported by SAN administrators, our measures for CFS availability
matched with Abe’s availability as shown in Table 2.2. Therefore, we have higher confidence
in the measures of availability and CU as we scaled the models to represent a peta-scale
computer with a petabyte storage system. The storage availability in Figure 2.4 refers to
configuration (0.7,2.92,8+2,4), which models the Abe cluster’s current environment. We find
that the RAID6 subsystem in this configuration continues to provide an availability of 1, but
the CFS availability is reduced from 0.972 to 0.909 as one scales the design to support the
peta-scale system. The reduction is mainly due to correlated failures in OSS and hardware.
Improving upon Abe cluster’s design, the architect could provide an additional standby or
spare OSS to replace the failed OSS quickly. Our evaluation shows that this approach can
improve the availability by 3%. To improve the availability further, the architects have to
develop solutions to mitigate correlated errors. For example, improving the robustness of
the Lustre-FS can reduce the software-correlated errors. The CU in Figure 2.4 shows that
the cluster’s network architecture between the compute nodes and the CFS has a profound
impact on the cluster utility available to the users. The trend to move away from customized
backplanes to COTS network hardware (with its complicated software stacks) has decreased
the CU. The transient errors seen in the network can be mitigated by providing multiple
network paths between the compute nodes and the CFS.
2.7 Conclusion
Many researchers have focused on developing and understanding dependability of clusters
for supercomputing applications. In this chapter, we have taken steps to understand the
25
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
1.05
96
(Abe)
828 1428 2190 3148 4344 5828 7660 9911 12664
Abe cluster scaled by storage size in terabytes
A
v
a
ila
b
ili
ty
Storage-availability CFS-availability-spare-OSS CFS-availability CU
Figure 2.4: Availability and utility of the Abe cluster when scaled to petaflop-petabyte
system
dependability and availability of the ABE cluster through failure data analysis and discus-
sions with administrators at multiple levels of the cluster operation, from the lowest level of
the SAN’s availability, to the cluster’s availability, and to user perception of cluster utility
at the top level. Our key findings through analysis and simulation showed that the RAID6
design for a disk’s dependability has limited the impact of disk failures on the CFS, even
when the model is scaled to evaluate the support for peta-scale systems. On the other hand,
transient errors, hardware errors, and software errors contribute significantly to failures, and
these components are the limiting factors for the high availability of the CFS. We believe
that peta-scale architects will have to focus on those issues to develop solutions to improve
the overall availability of the CFS.
More generally we have shown the success of component-based system modeling, combined
with data analysis for real systems, for evaluating the availability of the ABE’s CFS. We
will extend this method in later chapters to model more complex storage systems.
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CHAPTER 3
MODELING STORAGE SYSTEM FAULTS
3.1 Introduction
More so than in the past, the high-performance computing systems of tomorrow will grow in
computing power and storage space far faster than the growth of per-chip computing power,
and storage density. Today’s large scale systems are dominated by components assembled
from commodity PC hardware, aggregated into large clustered systems [11, 39]. Node counts
for state of the art terascale systems number in the tens of thousands, and peta-scale systems
are likely to contain hundreds of thousands of nodes. Under these conditions the normally
rare mean time to failure (MTTF) of various components compose to create a short MTTF
for the first failure in the composed system. Faults that previously were unlikely to occur
within the mean life time of a system also scale up in frequency system wide, presenting new
challenges which current fault tolerance methods do not address [11, 40]. Understanding
these failure models is a key first step towards developing tools to evaluate their impact, and
the effectiveness of proposed methods for coping with these failures.
In Chapter 2 we explored a component based model of a large-scale storage system, using
only whole disk failures. In this Chapter we expand our portfolio of fault-models to include
latent sector errors (LSEs) and undetected disk errors (UDEs). Our fault model for LSEs
is derived from the existing fault models in the literature, while our the UDE fault model
we present is a novel model which we will derive from various data in the literature and
an understanding of the physical manifestations of UDEs. These fault models will be used
along with whole disk failures in subsequent chapters to model storage system reliability in
more complex fault environments.
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3.1.1 Challenges
Understanding how faults change with larger scale systems faces many challenges, chief
among them being the unwillingness of system owners to publicly report failure data [41].
Vendor specified parameters are thus the most common source for failure models. These
parameters, most commonly given as the MTTF, are of dubious accuracy, often based on
back of the envelope calculations, giving radically different values, depending on the assump-
tions made. This has led to a high level of skepticism towards these vendor derived figures
[42, 7]. Coupled with this is the large discrepancies between vendor reported MTTF and
user reported MTTF [43, 44].
3.1.2 Profiling Failures in Large-Scale Systems
It has been shown by [41] that disks are the most commonly replaced component of large
scale systems. This is in part due to their high population within a system, compared to
other hardware components. Other commonly replaced components include system memory,
power supplies, and motherboards or CPUs. Given the current lack of detailed failure data
for components other than those of the storage system in large-scale systems, we will focus
our study on storage level failures.
While in the past storage failures were viewed as an all-or-nothing scenario, i.e. either
the drive was working perfectly, or not at all, these models have proven inaccurate for large-
scale systems. Modern storage systems are known to suffer from more complex faults, which
primarily fall into one of two categories: LSEs, and UDEs [45]. In the following sections we
will investigate each of these failure models.
3.2 Latent Sector Errors
3.2.1 Introduction
While LSEs do not typically contribute to the MTTF of the entire drive, they do influence
the reliability of data on a given drive, creating a new metric for failure on a drive, the mean
28
time to data loss (MTTDL). While many modern storage systems rely on RAID to provide
redundancy, faults such as LSEs are somewhat orthogonal to those issues solved by RAID,
especially since a latent sector error is not evident until the affected sector is accessed after
the fault occurs [9]. LSEs are orthogonal to RAID given the fact that a single latent sector
error has the potential to lead to data loss during a RAID group reconstruction [46]. LSEs
are distinguished from other types of disk faults based on the way a disk responds in the
presence of the fault. LSEs specifically refer to those cases where a sector cannot be read
or written, or when the sector reports an uncorrectable ECC error [9]. In all of these cases,
the sector is considered lost.
LSEs seem, at least in part, to be affected by the manufacturing quality of the disk in
question. While 8.5% of near-line disks were found by [9] to suffer from a latent sector error,
only 1.9% of enterprise class disks exhibited this behavior. Both classes of disks are more
likely to develop LSEs with time, but the proportion of near-line disks which have suffered a
latent sector error was shown to grow more rapidly than enterprise class disks. Disk size was
found to have an effect as well with the proportion of disks suffering a latent sector error
increasing with capacity, however the proportion of LSEs per Gigabyte does not change
appreciably with increased capacity [9]. While the quality of the drive matters with respect
to the first latent sector error [9] found that for disks with at least one error, near-line drives
were equally likely to have additional LSEs when compared to enterprise class drives.
3.2.2 LSE Model
LSEs have been shown to exhibit spacial locality [9]. According to [9], given a single latent
sector error, the probability of finding one or more LSEs within a 10MB radius of the existing
error is 0.5. LSEs were also found to exhibit temporal locality, [9] found that between 40%
and 80% of errors occurred within one minute of a previous error. Interarrival times were
classified using two measures, the temporal locality exhibited by arrivals, and a measure [9]
calls decay, which is a measure of the time taken to develop n additional LSEs, as measured
from the first latent sector error on the disk. In addition to a high level of temporal locality,
it was found that 54.8% of near-line, and 62.0% of enterprise class disks developed at least
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one additional error within one month. 5% of near-line and 10% of near-line disks developed
at least 50 additional errors within one month. Interestingly, the age of the disk does not
seem to have a direct effect on decay. Most additional faults will develop within the first
month after the initial fault.
3.2.3 Mitigation
RAID has been shown to be insufficient for prevent the loss of data from LSEs [46], and even
a full scrub detected only 86.6% of LSEs on near-line disks, and 61.5% of LSEs on enterprise
class disks. Read operations were likewise found to detect 13.4% and 19.1% of LSEs for
near-line and enterprise drives. Writes do not detect latent sector errors for near-line disks,
due to near-line disks automatically reassigning bad sectors, but in enterprise disks detected
19.3% of LSEs. Overall standard mitigation methods found 77.4% of LSEs during normal
operation.
3.3 Undetected Disk Errors
3.3.1 Introduction
Despite the reliability of modern disks, recent studies have made it increasingly clear that
a new class of faults, that of UDEs are a real challenge facing storage systems as capacity
scales [13, 47, 40]. While RAID systems have proven quite effective in protecting data from
traditional failure modes [12], these new silent data corruption events are a significant prob-
lem unaddressed by RAID [13]. UDE faults themselves are drawn from two distinct classes,
undetected read errors (UREs) and undetected write errors (UWEs). UREs manifest as
transient errors, and are unlikely to effect system state beyond their occurrence. UWEs,
on the other hand, are persistent errors which are only detectable during a read operation
subsequent to the faulty write, and thus manifest in a similar manner to a URE [40]. Met-
rics to quantify the occurrence of data corruption due to UDEs have not been presented
before since these events have been deemed to be very rare. Recently capacity scaling has
30
made UDEs common enough to be a concern and drives further study both on the rate of
occurrence of these faults, and their manifestation as errors from a user perspective.
While both evidence of UDEs and suggested techniques for their mitigation have been
outlined in the literature [13, 40], it is clear that there are several situations where many of
these techniques will not be able to prevent UDE induced faults from manifesting as errors
[47].
In order to fully understand the effect of UDEs and how they manifest in a given storage
system, one must model the disks at a fine level of detail, looking at individual block read
and write information in order to track portions of the disk which are suffering from a UDE,
the propagation of UWEs due to normal operations within the RAID system (including
rebuild events), and the effectiveness of mitigation techniques to prevent a UDE based fault
from manifesting as an error.
3.3.2 UDE Model
A growing concern in the storage community has been errors for which RAID [12, 45] does not
provide adequate protection. Schroeder and Gibson note that despite a supposed MTTF
for drives ranging from 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 hours field data suggest that MTTF is, in
practice, much lower [41]. By analyzing data corruption events for over 1.53 million disks
in production storage systems Bairavasundaram et al. documented cases of data corruption
events that occurred in a 41 month period. This work illustrates the existence of several
types of rare faults which manifest as corrupt data blocks. These errors were detected by
their production system due to additional detection mechanisms implemented at the file
system layer by their system. We refer to these silent data corruption events [48, 45] as
UDEs [40].
UDEs can be divided into two primary categories, UWEs and UREs [40], and arise from
a variety of factors, including software, hardware and firmware malfunctions. The primary
difference between UWEs and UREs is that UREs are transient in nature, while UWEs
result in a changed system state that can cause many subsequent reads to return corrupt
data. Table 3.1 summarizes the primary types of UDEs, and how they manifest as actual
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Table 3.1: Summary of UDE types and manifestations
I/O Type UDE type Manifestation
Write (UWE) Dropped Write Stale data
Near off-track write Possible stale data on read
Far off-track write Stale data on intended track
Corrupt data on written track
Read (URE) Near off-track read Possible stale data
Far off-track read Corrupt data
errors on the disk [40].
Dropped writes occur when the write head fails to overwrite the data already present on
a track. In this case the disk remains in its previous state as if the write never occurred [40].
Off-track writes (also referred to as misdirected writes) come in two categories, near and
far off-track. Both types occur when the write head is not properly aligned with the track.
In the case of a near off-track write, the data is written in the gap between tracks, adjacent
to the intended track. On a read operation, the head may align itself to either the target
track, or the off-track, potentially producing stale data. Far off-track writes occur when
data is written even further off-track, such that it corrupts data in another track entirely.
Subsequent reads to the track which was mistakenly written will produce corrupt data, while
reads to the track which was intended to be written will produce stale data. [40]
It is important to note, however, that not all UWEs introduced disk errors manifest as
a user level undetected data corruption error. A subsequent (good) write to the affected
track will remove the error, preventing undetected data corruption. Likewise a near off-
track write will cause future reads to randomly return either good or stale data. Though
a far off-track write results in both stale data on the intended track, and corrupt data on
the unintended track, if the unintended track is not currently in use, that part of the effect
will be mitigated. Likewise, a UWE may manifest as several undetected data corruption
events if the same track is read multiple times before it is corrected by a subsequent write
operation. Thus a one-to-one correspondence does not exist between UDEs and user level
undetected data corruption errors.
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3.3.3 UDEs in RAID Storage Systems
Systems designed for high reliability often make use of RAID storage systems. While there
has been little study of the effect of UDEs in RAID systems, it has been shown that data
scrubbing, the normal disk error mitigation and detection technique in such systems, is not
sufficient to protect against all UDEs [47, 40]. Even under RAID6, the most powerful RAID
technique in common usage, a data scrub may incorrectly assess the integrity of data due to
a UDE [40], and in some cases even propagate the error.
3.3.4 Modeling UDEs
Storage systems faults are complex events, arising from a combination of hardware, software,
and firmware malfunctions. In the case of well studied faults, such as latent sector errors,
and complex models have been derived to capture detailed relationships and correlations.
Bairavasundaram et al., when designing a model for latent sector errors, capture temporal
and spatial locality measures [9]. Schroeder and Gibson in their study of MTTF propose and
fit both Weibull and Gamma distributions, obtaining better results than with exponentially
distributed inter-failure times [41]. Unfortunately when it comes to UDEs, there is very
little information on their rates of occurrence, let alone enough data to fit multiparameter
distributions, or ascertain spatial and temporal relationships on their failure. UDEs could
be modeled with exponential inter-failure times, making no assumptions with respect to
temporal and spatial locality.
The rates of UDE occurrence were estimated by using a combination of the data presented
in [9] and the data presented in [13], and are summarized in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Estimated rates of UDEs in UDEs
I/O
.
Estimated Rate
UDE Type Near-line Enterprise
Dropped I/O 9 · 10−13 9 · 10−14
Near-off Track I/O 10−13 10−14
Far-off Track I/O 10−12 10−13
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Figure 3.1: Disk tracks after a normal I/O operation, near-off track fault, and far-off track
fault.
3.3.5 Mitigation
Despite the threats to data integrity and storage system reliability posed by UDEs, pro-
duction systems rarely implement detection and mitigation strategies [49]. Methods have,
however, been proposed, if not evaluated in real systems. One family of proposed methods
to mitigate the effect of UDEs in RAID are of the form of parity appendix methods [40].
In these methods, meta-data is co-located with some or all of the blocks associated with
a chunk of data and its parity blocks. In our models we focus on a data parity appendix
method [50, 40], which utilizes the meta-data portion of a block to store a sequence number.
This sequence number is the same for all blocks in the write. UDEs can be detected with
this method by comparing the sequence numbers stored in the parity and data blocks. The
sequence numbers won’t match when a UDE manifests as an error unless a collision occurs
in the sequence number with probability
P (Seq(Parity) = Seq(UDE)) =
1
2b
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where b is the number of bits allocated for the sequence number. On a read, the sequence
number for each data block is retrieved from parity and compared, allowing this technique
to mitigate UDE manifestations, at the cost of an extra read.
3.3.6 RAID and Parity Pollution
The more typical method for ensuring data integrity and reliability is to employ some form
of parity scrub. In these cases a scheduled process checks stored data against the relevant
parity strips in a RAID subsystem. While this can detect UDEs under normal operations, it
cannot reliably detect all data corruption due to UDEs. The scrub can mistakenly find data
or parity to be correct when both are wrong. Even in cases when data corruption from a
UDE is detected, it often cannot be corrected. To understand these properties of UDEs we
provide one example each for a RAID5 and RAID6 system. We consider a RAID stripe to
be the minimum set of data blocks and parity blocks from a set of disks which are related in
the reliability framework. Read operations are processed by reading the relevant data from
the relevant disks. Write operations cause updates to both data and parity blocks in the
form of a read-modify-write operation.
Given a RAID5 system, and a RAID strip consisting of data blocks, A,B, and C and
parity block P we represent the data values in A,B, and C as a, b, and c and use the symbol
⊕ to represent a XOR operation. Figure 3.2 shows an example series of operations that
leads to an inconsistent parity state known as parity pollution [40]. The stripe begins in the
state represented by the tuple
(a0, b0, c0, a0 ⊕ b0 ⊕ c0)
.
The second row in the figure shows a write operation, intended to update the block A to
a1, which suffers a UDE in the form of a dropped write. This failure is not detected by the
system. The parity disk is read, and modified as follows
(a1 ⊕ a0)⊕ (a0 ⊕ b0 ⊕ c0)→ a1 ⊕ b0 ⊕ c0
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Figure 3.2: Example parity pollution due to a dropped write. The first step has a UWE
during a write; the the second step is a normal write; the third step represents a disk
failure; in the final step the disk is rebuilt incorrectly.
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. The parity is in a state which would be correct if a1 had been properly written, but is
inconsistent with the state of the stripe at present. A scrub at this point would detect the
inconsistency, but not where the error had occurred. A disk scrub would result in marking
the entire stripe as bad resulting in data loss for the entire stripe. The same situation would
occur if the data block was written successfully but the read-modify-write had resulted in
a dropped write to the parity block. The next row of the figure represents a successful
write which updates the strip A to a2. The read-modify-write operation to the parity disk,
however, produces an interesting result. The data block A is read as a0 before the write,
resulting in the following modification of the parity block:
(a2 ⊕ a0)⊕ (a1 ⊕ b0 ⊕ c0)→ a2 ⊕ a0 ⊕ a1 ⊕ b0 ⊕ c0
which is then written back to P . Though the entire operation was error free it has resulted in
pollution of the parity block which is now in a state which is inconsistent with the remainder
of the disk. The fourth row shows the state of the RAID stripe after the disk on which B
resides has failed, and a subsequent rebuilt operation has been performed. Even though the
stripe is now consistent, the B block contains an error as it has been rebuilt as b0 ⊕ a0 ⊕ a1
instead of b0. This error is now undetectable by a parity scrub.
This shows how a single UWE can combine with otherwise normal operations on a RAID5
system to result in a state in which an error is present, but undetectable by any normal means
including a parity scrub. A similar situation can occur for RAID6 systems, and is detailed
in [40].
3.4 Conclusions
In this section we have detailed two new important, but rare, faults, LSEs and UDEs and
the ways in which they can occur on disks. We have reviewed the fault models for LSEs
presented in the literature and detailed a novel fault model for UDEs based on existing data
and an understanding of the ways in which UDEs manifest. We will use our UDE fault
model in Chapter 4, and both the LSE and UDE fault models in Chapter 6 to develop an
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understanding of how these faults, combined with whole disk failure, impact the reliability
of large scale storage systems.
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CHAPTER 4
SIMULATING THE EFFECTS OF UDES ON
LARGE-SCALE STORAGE SYSTEMS
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, we discussed building component-based models of large-scale systems using
real data. In Chapter 3 we discussed a new class of faults, UDEs. In this chapter we
combine these methods to study the reliability of a set of storage system designs in the
presence of UDEs to understand their impact under various real world workloads, modeled
at a component-based level.
Recent studies have made it increasingly clear that UDEs are a real challenge facing storage
systems as capacity scales [13, 47, 40]. While RAID systems have proven quite effective in
protecting data from traditional failure modes [12], these new silent data corruption events
are a significant problem unaddressed by RAID [13]. Metrics to quantify the occurrence of
data corruption due to UDEs have not been presented before since these events have been
deemed to be very rare. Recently capacity scaling has made UDEs common enough to be
a concern and drives further study both on the rate of occurrence of these faults, and their
manifestation as errors from a user perspective.
While both evidence of UDEs and suggested techniques for their mitigation have been
outlined in the literature [13, 40], it is clear that there are several situations where many of
these techniques will not be able to prevent UDE induced faults from manifesting as errors
[47]. Given that the rate of UDE occurrence is low, testing these techniques in a real system
would be costly, likely requiring a prohibitively large array of disks to witness UDEs in large
enough quantities to derive measures of their effects within a reasonable period of time. A
need therefor exists for modeling tools which address the particular challenges presented
by such systems. A model provides the capability to analyze the risk posed by UDEs in a
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given system and the fault tolerance coverage provided by suggested mitigation techniques.
A simple analytical model could fail to account for important emergent trends in UDE
manifestation for a given workload. For example a block that has had a UWE error must
be read before that fault manifests as data corruption and therefore the chances of system
failure depend on the I/O stream in question. A simulation approach that is customizable
and can determine the effect of UDEs for an arbitrary workload is an effective way to capture
this behavior.
Efficient simulation of UDE faults in large scale systems proves to be a serious challenge,
however, due to the stiffness of the system. A system is said to be stiff when events occurring
on vastly different timescales must be simulated in order to capture the behavior one wishes
to model. In order to fully understand the effect of UDEs and how they manifest in a given
storage system, one must model the disks at a fine level of detail, looking at individual
block read and write information in order to track portions of the disk which are suffering
from a UDE, the propagation of UWEs due to normal operations within the RAID system
(including rebuild events), and the effectiveness of mitigation techniques to prevent a UDE
based fault from manifesting as an error. This means any model of such processes will
necessarily consider events on two very different scales, from the very fast block level I/Os
(with a rate of roughly 100 ios/sec), to the much rarer UDEs (with a rate of roughly 10−12
UDEs/io).
In order to satisfy these requirements we present in this chapter an extensible hybrid
framework for simulating large scale storage systems that combines discrete event simula-
tion on multiple levels of resolution with numerical analysis in a hybridized fashion. Our
methods take advantage of dependency relationships within a the I/O stream to temporally
switch between numerical methods, a block level discrete event simulator, and a hybridized
numerical model with some discrete events simulated. Our techniques achieve a more effi-
cient use of time and space than discrete event simulation alone. These methods have been
implemented in a simulator which takes as input a model of a storage system and a model
of a workload, and produces as output an estimate of the rate at which UDEs manifest
as corruption at the user level. Our simulator has been designed in a way that allows the
user to build component level models of storage systems, extend components to create new
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behavior, and test under arbitrary workloads and rates of UDEs. Mitigation techniques can
be easily implemented by extending the implemented base classes for disks.
The chapter is organized as follows: We will then a model for UDEs for use in our simu-
lation, this derivation includes determining appropriate rates for the various types of UDEs,
as these rates have yet to be determined in the literature. Next we will discuss how we create
workload and system models models for a novel hybrid simulator and the operation of the
simulator itself. Finally, we present our results which illustrate the problems posed by UDEs
as systems scale, and the effectiveness of even simple mitigation techniques in preventing
the faults injected by UDEs from manifesting as undetected data corruption events.
4.1.1 Modeling Considerations
Given our assumptions that UDE manifestation is likely highly correlated to the workload
and system in which they occur, we take a flexible approach in building our system models,
and solution techniques. Our solution techniques do not make any assumptions about the
underlying workload or model, allowing the user to construct appropriate workloads or mod-
els based on their own needs or assumptions. We provide a common interface for workload
models, allowing the use of traces, or probabilistic models (as was used in our evaluation),
and a framework for constructing a storage system model by composing common component
level objects as detailed in Chapter 2, which can be subclassed as needed to increase the
library of components from which the system can be built.
Once a workload model and system model have been created, we utilized a multi-modal
simulator which executes the model at three different resolutions, based on a dependency
relationship with UDEs which occur in the I/O stream.
4.2 Workload Modeling
The manifestation of UDEs as actual data corruption events is dependent on read operations
following a write which suffers from a UDE (or in the case of UREs, just simply a read oper-
ation). This fact makes modeling the workload for the system an important consideration.
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Figure 4.1: Two state DTMC read/write workload model.
The mix of reads and writes impacts the manifestation of UDEs, as does the correlation of
reads and writes in time. While this fact drives a desire to use realistic representative work
loads in any simulation, perhaps even traces, the rare nature of UDEs makes makes this a
difficult proposition. Utilizing a trace based simulation has two problems. The first is a lack
of sufficiently detailed traces, and the second is a lack of traces of sufficient length. Due
to the long periods of time involved in simulating UDE mitigation, one requires hundreds,
if not thousands, of days of block level traces. Additionally, trace based analysis is limited
to a handful of possible trajectories in the file system, only those captured in the available
traces. Given these limitations we form a simple probabilistic model of the workload which
we use to generate synthetic workloads that statistically match available traces.
Generating a representative synthetic workload has proven difficult in the past, and is still
largely considered an open problem. For the purposes of this analysis we present a simplified
workload model which captures the primary metrics of interest for our needs, namely the
ordering of reads and writes, which can be directly parametrized using real traces to which we
have direct access. Despite our selection of this method of workload modeling, our simulator
has been designed in a flexible manner which allows it to utilize any workload model a
user would like to design. The main simulator couples with the workload model simply by
requesting events from the workload model, including the type of I/O, and size and location
of the write, and the time until the next I/O. It then injects UDEs as appropriate.
In order to characterize the workload used in our study, we create a statistical model of
five primary features from a given trace.
• Per Disk Rate of I/O - Given that our UDE rates are in units of UDEs
I/O
, it is
important to know the rate at which I/O is conducted in our workload. This rate is
captured in the workload parameter io/s. Our workload model assumes exponentially
distributed inter-arrival times, with rate io/s.
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• Diversity of the I/O Stream - Just knowing the rate of incoming I/O requests
is not, however, enough to characterize the system. We also need some measure of
the diversity of the I/O stream. While io/s measures the number of I/O requests per
second, it tells us nothing about the average number of unique chunks on which I/O
operations are performed, per second. We introduce the parameter uc/s to model this,
which is a measure of the unique chunks read or written each second.
• I/O Size - Based on our analysis of some available traces we model the size of an I/O
operation within the simulator as a Exponential random variable with a mean request
size of sizei/o blocks.
• Read/Write Composition of the I/O Stream - When the simulator is not suf-
fering from a UDE, our simulator discards I/O events rather than simulate them, as
they cannot have an effect on the rate of undetected data corruption errors. When an
UDE does occur, it is important to know whether it occurred during a read operation
(and is thus transient) or during a write operation, (and could thus lead to a series
of data corruption events). Towards this end we estimate the parameter P (R), which
tells us the probability with which a given I/O is a read request.
• Correlation of I/O Stream Composition - In our analysis of available traces, we
found that an I/O request for an individual chunk is highly temporally correlated with
the most recent I/O for that same chunk in the trace. In order to model this behavior
we utilize a discrete time Markov chain (DTMC) for each active chunk to determine
the next I/O operation that will take place after a read or a write, as illustrated in
Figure 4.1. This model has four transition probabilities which we estimate from the
trace data. P (R|R) is the probability of a chunk being read if the most recent I/O
for the chunk was also a read. P (R|W ) is the probability of a chunk being read when
the most recent I/O request was a write. P (W |R) is the probability of a chunk being
written when the most recent I/O request was a read, and finally P (W |W ) is the
probability of a chunk being written when the most recent I/O request was a write.
Table 4.1 indicates the values of these parameters for three different workloads. The first
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Table 4.1: Parameters for the workload models.
Parameters Abstract Write Heavy Read Heavy
io/s 100 122.04 90.24
uc/s 10 16.2623 7.2226
sizeio 4096 B 3465.98 B 2448.94 B
P (R) 0.6 0.23161 0.82345
P (R|R) 0.6 0.4488 0.829483
P (R|W ) 0.6 0.8339 0.204677
P (W |R) 0.4 0.5512 0.170517
P (W |W ) 0.4 0.1661 0.795323
workload, which we call the Abstract Workload, is derived from parameters assumed in the
calculations presented in Section 3.3.4 derived from [13] and [41]. Both the “Read Heavy”
and “Write Heavy” workloads are estimated empirically from actual disk traces. Separate
DTMCs are kept in the workload model for each chunk on the disk that is being read or
written.
4.3 Disk Model
In order to understand the manifestation of UDEs into user-level undetected data corruption
errors, we present a block level model of storage systems which can be used to understand
the actual effects of these faults in real systems. This block level model is designed to be
easy to extend and compose with other similar models to allow for the construction of more
complex disk models. Each individual block level model keeps track of the state of a single
disk. Models can be composed to allow the simulation of various RAID configurations and
techniques for detecting UDEs. In our models, for example, a RAID6 system is simply a
subclass of a disk, which contains a number of composed disk models. RAID6 with mitigation
is simply a subclass of our RAID6 model which implements the sequence number data parity
appendix method described in Section 3.3.5.
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4.3.1 Block-Level Model
We model each block on the disk as a non-deterministic finite automaton (NFA). The set
of states Q of the NFA represents the states of the block, and is comprised of the union
between a set of stable states Qstable and unstable states Qunstable defined by
Q = Qstable ∪Qunstable
Qstable = {good, stale, corrupt}
Qunstable = {stale-good, corrupt-good,
corrupt-stale}
The state of the block is in the state good only if no fault has occurred for that block. The
state stale represents a faulty block state after either a dropped write, or a far-off track
write which was intended for the block in question. The state corrupt represents a faulty
block state after a far-off track write which was intended for another block, but was written
to the block in question instead.
Unstable states differ from stable states in that the behavior of a read operation is ill-
defined and may return either good data, or corrupt/stale data. They are used to model the
effects of near off-track writes. In the case of an unstable state where one of the tracks is
good, a read to that track will not necessarily manifest as an error. We make the assumption
that reading either track is equally probable.
The unstable state corrupt-corrupt is omitted from this set, as it is equivalent to a
corrupt state, as is stale-stale for similar reasons.
The sector model transitions from state to state on a set of input symbols Σ, which
correspond to the write events to the sector, both faulty and non-faulty. The set of faulty
write events corresponds to the set of UDE events discussed in Section 3.3.2, which is shown
below.
Σ = {GW, DW, N-OTW, F-OTWH , F-OTWO}
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Figure 4.2: NFA representation of transitions in the block model.
Symbol GW represents a good write event. DW represents a dropped write event. N-OTW
represents a near offtrack write event. F-OTWH indicates a far offtrack write event which was
intended to write to this block but instead wrote to another. F-OTWO represents a far offtrack
write event which was intended for another block but was instead incorrectly written to the
block in question.
Figure 4.2 shows the NFA states with transitions for a single block, indicating how the
block changes states due to UDE events. Of particular importance is the fact that from
all states a good write event brings us to the good state, masking the UDE. This fact is
important when considering how a UDE fault manifests as an actual error. In the case that
a UDE occurred, but the same blocks were again written with no error before a read for
those blocks was issued, the fault will not manifest as an error.
4.3.2 Disk-Level Model
In order to represent an entire disk, the block level model indicated in Section 4.3.1 is
implemented for every block in a disk, forming our base disk model. Each block is indexed,
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and thus can have individual write operations directed to it, causing state changes in the
underlying automata. For efficient storage of the automata, we take advantage of the fact
that, barring a UDE which is by definition a rare event, the entire disk consists of blocks
in the good state. By representing the state of all blocks in a disk using a sparse matrix
with good as the default value, we achieve a space efficient implementation of even very
large disks. This sparse matrix is represented with a hash-table, using a hash function of
LBA mod n, for some n. While a simple function, it exploits the fact that UDEs will most
often manifest on a disk as a string of consecutive blocks in a state other than good. The
modulo function then works to try to ensure that consecutive blocks will appear in different
elements of the hash-table, which keeps access times for the hash table at a minimum. This
improves the time it takes to update the state of our various block level NFAs, and thus
overall simulation time.
Individual disk models are composed with a controller to form RAID units. The controller
model presents to the simulator an interface to write to the underlying disks as if they were a
single larger disk. It performs the calculations of which stripe to write to on a block by block
basis to enforce the RAID model. The RAID interface also serves to inform the simulator of
the number of actual disk reads and writes executed per requested operation so that UDEs
occurring due to a single logical write to a RAID system will be generated appropriately
for the larger numbers of actual disk reads and writes performed due to RAID operations
such as read-modify-write. Each RAID unit undergoes weekly scrubbing, and we make the
assumption that during a scrub all UDEs will be detected and marked unreadable so as not
to result in a data corruption event in the future.
Parity scrub mismatches are handled by marking the affected blocks as unreadable, mean-
ing that any reads from the workload stream to these blocks will not be executed. On a
successful write operation (UDE or otherwise) to a block, this status is changed via the NFA
in Figure 4.2 treating the unreadable sector as being in the good state just before the write.
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4.4 Simulation Framework
Given the rare nature of UDEs, attempting to calculate the mean rates of undetected data
corruption due to their injection into a storage system using just discrete event simulation
would prove prohibitively costly. With the rates given in Table 3.2, it is not unreasonable
to expect 1013 or more I/O events in between UDEs. Even given a discrete event simulator
capable of processing 107 or more events per second evaluating a single UDE event would
take almost a month on modern workstations. This makes simulating a large number of
UDEs impractical, and seems to preclude their analysis via simulation.
We solve some of the efficiency issues inherent in simulating a stiff system by designing
our simulator to have three operating modes (illustrated in Figure 4.3), and allowing the
simulator to dynamically switch between modes to maximize efficiency while maintaining
accuracy in estimating the rate of undetected data corruption served to the user. While our
simulator improves our simulation time, it makes the assumption that the underlying storage
system consists only of basic RAID subsystems and that each subsystem is independent.
The first operating mode, which is purely numerical, is also the simplest. It takes the
parameters of the system model, workload model, and the rates entered for the various
UDE types, and from this estimates the UDE rate of the composed model and generates an
exponentially distributed inter-arrival time. The internal clock which is used to determine
the next event is then advanced to the indicated time, our metrics are updated, and we
process the UDE as appropriate.
The second mode utilizes discrete event simulation to model the interaction of the workload
with the faults injected into the storage system. In order to determine which events occurring
in the storage system cause a user level undetected data corruption event, lists are maintained
of both those chunks being actively read and written, and the chunks in the storage system
which have suffered from a UDE. Only those events which add or remove chunks from the
active list, or access faulty disk blocks are explicitly simulated. Since all other operations
will either read a chunk composed of good blocks, or write a good block to a block which is
already good, they cannot affect the state of blocks within the system. When the UDE can
no longer manifest as a data corruption event, i.e. when all active chunks which intersect
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with the faulty chunk are no longer active, or when the faulty chunk is overwritten with good
data, we pass from discrete event simulation into our simulator’s third operational mode.
The third mode is a hybrid of the first two, and combines discrete event simulation at
a higher level of abstraction than the second mode, with calculations which utilize a rate
adjustment to estimate the probability of a UDE before the next discrete event. Despite the
fact that by the third mode of our solution technique the UDE can longer manifest we must
be careful to respect the dependency the system has with respect to the last UDE injected
into the system, for the admittedly unlikely case that a second UDE might occur before the
system is no longer dependent on the events of the last UDE. This is done by modeling the
flow of chunks into and out of the active list, and calculating the probability of a UDE before
the next flow of a chunk into or out of the list and adjusting the rate of the next UDE based
on the current composition of the active list. The following sections describe the modes in
more detail.
Numerical Solution
UDE
Block Level I/O Events
Discrete Event Simulation
UDE can no longer manifest
as error
Hybrid Numerical
and Discrete Event
Model Flow of
Active Chunks for
Rate Tilting
Figure 4.3: Simulator Architecture
4.4.1 Numerical Solution Mode
Our simulator begins in its first mode, and calculates the expected rate of a UWE or URE.
This is done by first finding the expected number of reads and writes generated by an I/O
operation to one of the RAID units. To show how this calculation is accomplished we show
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the formulas for a RAID5 storage subsystem. Given a RAID5 strip size of sizestrip, and
a stripe width of w data disks plus one parity, the expected number of writes for a read-
modify-write operation is equal to the number of required strips, plus one write per stripe
written to update parity. One read is likewise required for each strip written in a row, plus
an additional potential read if the write crosses a row boundary giving the expected number
of writes for a read-modify-write as:
E[writes/read-modify-write] =
⌈
E[size]
sizestrip
⌉
+
⌈
max(E[size], sizestrip)− sizestrip
sizestrip
⌉
+⌈
E[size]
w · sizestrip
+
max(E[size], w · sizestrip)− sizestrip
w · sizestrip
⌉
(4.1)
and the expected number of reads for a read-modify-write as:
E[reads/read−modify− write] = E[writes/read-modify-write]
On a read to the RAID5 system, only a single read is performed giving us the following
reads and writes per read:
E[writes/read] = 0 (4.2)
E[reads/read] = 1.0 (4.3)
Using the values calculated with these equations it is possible to find the rate of UDEs,
given an I/O rate of λIO of which pread are reads, And it is possible, using these parameters
to generate a time to the next UDE (TUDE) as shown in the following equation:
TUDE = 1/(λIOpread(E[writes/read] + E[reads/read])
+ λIO(1− pread)(E[writes/read-modify-write] + E[reads/read-modify-write])) (4.4)
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Once we have determined a UDE will occur, we determine the type of UDE (UWE vs.
URE) and the mechanism (dropped, near-off track, far-off track) via uniformization [51]. In
the case of a URE, the error is transient, and we remain in numerical mode after handling
the UDE. In the case of a UWE, the error does not manifest immediately, and we switch
the simulator into the discrete event simulation mode.
4.4.2 Discrete Event Simulation Mode
The discrete event simulator makes only slight modifications to a standard discrete event
simulator as, for example, described in [52]. Pseudo-code for a single pass through the
main simulation loop is illustrated in Figure 4.4. The primary modification to the standard
algorithms is our creation and maintenance of two lists, the active chunk list, CA, and the
tainted chunk list CT . The set CT is comprised of all chunks which have blocks affected by
a UDE that can still serve corrupted data to the user. Between this set, and the set of all
chunks being actively read and written, CA, we can identify I/O events which do not affect
system state and safely discard them without updating the state of the simulator beyond
advancing the clock. This is because all events which do not modify the state of a block
within CT , or which do not alter the composition of CA or CT cannot serve corrupted or
stale data, or affect the rate at which additional UDEs occur.
At each step in the simulator, we process one event, comparing it to CA and CT to see
if our metric depends on the event, processing it if it does, and modifying CA and CT if
necessary. We continue with discrete event simulation until such a time as CT ∩ CA = ∅.
When this occurs, all UDEs have either been mitigated, or the chunks they occurred on will
not be read again until first written, and we no longer need to simulate I/Os on a block level
as they cannot result in a data corruption error. However, it is not enough to simply return
to our first, numerical, mode. So long as CA,i 6= ∅ and CA,i ∩ CA,0 6= ∅, where CA,0 was the
active chunk list when it was first true that CT ∩CA = ∅, and CA,i is the active chunk list at
some time i, we have a dependence on the state of the simulator during the previous UDE,
which must be maintained in the case that another UDE were to occur before CA,i = ∅ or
CA,i ∩ CA,0 = ∅, and thus we switch into our hybrid mode instead of the numerical mode.
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nextEvent ← eventList.head()
clock← clock + nextEvent.interarrivalTime
if nextEvent.io ∩(CA ∪ CT ) then
Process nextEvent
if nextEvent reads a block which suffered from a UDE then
Record UDE, update MTTDC
else {nextEvent writes a set of blocks B which suffered from a UDE}
CT ← CT ∪ B
end if
end if
if nextEvent is a chunk leaving CA then
CA ← CA \ nextEvent
end if
if nextEvent.io \ CA 6= ∅ then
CA ← CA ∪ nextEvent.io
CT ← CT ∪ nextEvent.io
end if
Schedule new event of the same type as nextEvent
Figure 4.4: Pseudo-code representation of a single pass through the main loop of the
discrete event simulator.
4.4.3 Hybrid Numerical and Discrete Event Mode
The Hybrid mode of operation of the simulator uses discrete event simulation to manage
the contents of CA. When a chunk leaves CA, it removes it from the set, and when a
chunk enters, it increments a counter of implicitly simulated active chunks, active chunks
represented by this counter are treated as the expected value of an active chunk from the
workload. In between events which modify CA, the hybrid mode acts in a manner similar
to the numerical mode described previously, calculating TUDE as shown in Equation 4.4.
Instead of using the parameters for the workload, however, it takes a less general approach
and estimates the same parameters from CA. It then uses these new estimates to perform a
rate adjustment calculation for TUDE, representing each of the parameters used to calculate
TUDE as a weighted average with the expected value of these parameters for the workload
in general. The weights used are simply the fraction of active chunks in CA as compared to
the total number |CA|+ implicit. When CA,i = ∅ or CA,i∩CA,0 = ∅, we return to the purely
numerical scheme as we are no longer dependent on the last UDE scenario.
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nextEvent ← eventList.head()
clock← clock + nextEvent.interarrivalTime
if nextEvent is an addition to CA then
implicit ← implicit + 1
end if
if nextEvent is a chunk leaving CA then
if implicit > 0 and nextEvent /∈ CA then
implicit ← implicit - 1
else
CA ← CA \ nextEvent
end if
end if
if CA = ∅ then
Switch to Numerical mode
end if
Adjust the rate for UDEs based on CA and Implicit
Schedule next change in CA
Figure 4.5: Pseudo-code representation of a single pass through the main loop of the
hybrid discrete event simulator.
4.5 Example Model Solution
We simulated three different example systems to ascertain the effect of UDEs in three set-
tings, a large-scale storage system, a large enterprise storage system, and a small business
storage system. The large-scale system was modeled as a set 1000 disks each with a capacity
of 1 terabyte, the enterprise system was modeled as a set of 512 disks, each with a capac-
ity of 300 gigabytes, and the small business system was modeled as a set of 32 disks, also
with capacities of 300 gigabytes each. Each of the three modeled systems were simulated
with three different workloads, as discussed in Section 4.2. The rate of I/O operations per
second for each system-workload pairing was calculated by multiplying the io/s parameter
for the workload by the number of disks (excluding those used for parity) in the system.
All systems, including those without mitigation, simulated a weekly parity scrub. A weekly
scrub [53] was chosen based on the existing literature, which discusses a wide range of scrub
intervals from every few days [54] to at least every two weeks [47, 9]. A scrub interval of one
week was chosen as a representative rate, but is not integral to our simulator, and can be
easily altered. Each of these systems was simulated with and without mitigation techniques.
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Table 4.2: Estimated mean proportion of UDEs which manifest as undetected data
corruption for various systems under the Abstract workload, with and without mitigation.
Mitigation Large System Enterprise System Small Business System
No 0.718 0.718 0.718
Yes 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028
UDE rates of three different orders of magnitude (10−11, 10−12, 10−13) were considered. A
total of 10 million UDEs were simulated for each scenario.
4.5.1 Validation
The results of the simulator were validated using a simple combinatorial model of a UDE
process. The combinatoric model functions the same as our simulator during the initial stage,
but once it has decided a UDE has occurred, instead of switching to discrete simulation, it
utilizes the DTMC described in Figure 4.1, using a geometric distribution with parameter
equal to the transition probability to the opposite state to find the number of reads before
a subsequent write event. After the UDE has been resolved, it simply calculates the next
UDE, and continues as before. Comparing results for the proportion of UDEs manifesting as
undetected data corruptions, and rates of user-level undetected data corruption errors from
this combinatorial model with results from the simulator, with parity scrubbing and other
mitigation features switched off, helped us to gain confidence in our simulator and ensure
it was generating results which agreed with our combinatoric model. Estimation of rates at
which UDEs manifested as user level undetected data corruption events by the simulator
were within 4.6% of those given by our combinatoric model, for 10 million simulated UDEs
with no scrubbing, and no mitigation.
4.5.2 Results
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 summarize the proportion of UDEs which actually manifest as an un-
detected data corruption event for the simulated scenarios. As can be seen in Table 4.2
the proportion of UDEs which manifest as an actual error does not vary significantly when
varying system parameters. The various rates of UDEs/IO simulated are not listed as the
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Table 4.3: Estimated mean proportion of UDEs which manifest as undetected data
corruption for various workloads on the large system model, with and without mitigation.
Mitigation Abstract Workload Read Heavy Workload Write Heavy Workload
No 0.718 0.275 0.887
Yes 0.0028 0.0011 0.0035
Table 4.4: Estimated mean and standard deviation of rate of UDE manifestation as
undetected data corruption per second for various systems under the Abstract workload,
with and without mitigation, for various rates of UDEs/IO.
Estimated rate for various rates of UDEs/IO
10−11 10−12 10−13
System Mit. µ 0.95% conf. µ 0.95% conf. µ 0.95% conf.
Large scale No 6.278 · 10−7 ±3.26 · 10−13 6.282 · 10−8 ±3.87 · 10−14 6.282 · 10−9 ±3.29 · 10−15
Large scale Yes 2.415 · 10−9 ±3.28 · 10−14 2.466 · 10−10 ±3.38 · 10−15 2.519 · 10−11 ±2.97 · 10−16
Enterprise No 3.217 · 10−7 ±1.98 · 10−13 3.218 · 10−8 ±1.98 · 10−14 3.221 · 10−9 ±1.14 · 10−15
Enterprise Yes 1.259 · 10−9 ±1.30 · 10−14 1.262 · 10−10 ±2.10 · 10−15 1.253 · 10−11 ±1.15 · 10−16
Small No 2.012 · 10−8 ±8.30 · 10−15 2.012 · 10−9 ±5.77 · 10−16 2.012 · 10−10 ±8.27 · 10−17
Small Yes 7.930 · 10−11 ±8.49 · 10−16 7.868 · 10−12 ±8.33 · 10−17 7.857 · 10−13 ±1.14 · 10−17
results were the same for all three parameters. Adding the mitigation technique described in
Section 3.3.5 had the effect of reducing the proportion of UDEs which manifested as unde-
tected data corruption by two orders of magnitude. Table 4.3 shows the effect that varying
the workload can have on the proportion of UDEs that manifest as an error. While both
the Abstract workload and Write Heavy workload have similar rates of manifestation, the
Read Heavy workload has a much lower proportion of UDEs which manifest as undetected
data corruptions. In all cases, adding mitigation had the effect of reducing the proportion
of UDEs manifesting as errors by two orders of magnitude.
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 illustrate the relationship between the rate of undetected data corrup-
tion errors and varying system and workload parameters, and rates of UDEs/IO. Table 4.4
Table 4.5: Estimated mean and standard deviation of rate of UDE manifestation as
undetected data corruption per second for the large scale system under the all workloads,
with and without mitigation, for various rates of UDEs/IO.
Estimated rate for various rates of UDEs/IO
10−11 10−12 10−13
System Mit. µ 0.95% conf. µ 0.95% conf. µ 0.95% conf.
Abstract No 6.278 · 10−7 ±3.27 · 10−13 6.282 · 10−8 ±3.87 · 10−14 6.282 · 10−9 ±3.29 · 10−15
Abstract Yes 2.415 · 10−9 ±3.28 · 10−14 2.466 · 10−10 ±3.38 · 10−15 2.519 · 10−11 ±2.97 · 10−16
Read Heavy No 2.404 · 10−7 ±1.28 · 10−13 2.405 · 10−8 ±2.44 · 10−14 2.401 · 10−9 ±1.79 · 10−15
Read Heavy Yes 9.345 · 10−10 ±1.31 · 10−14 9.310 · 10−11 ±1.14 · 10−15 9.476 · 10−12 ±1.68 · 10−16
Write Heavy No 7.764 · 10−7 ±5.52 · 10−13 7.763 · 10−8 ±4.68 · 10−14 7.766 · 10−9 ±3.51 · 10−15
Write Heavy Yes 3.048 · 10−9 ±2.39 · 10−14 3.014 · 10−10 ±2.03 · 10−15 3.038 · 10−11 ±4.09 · 10−16
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shows that the rate of UDEs manifesting as undetected data corruption declines both as the
rate of UDEs/IO decreases, and as the size of the system decreases. Those scenarios which
involved mitigation decreased the rate of undetected data corruption events by between two
and three orders of magnitude. To put these rates into perspective, Table 4.6 shows the
mean interval between undetected data corruption events that correspond to these rates.
Table 4.5 summarizes the effect of varying the workload while holding the simulated system
constant. We show the results for the large system only, as the results for enterprise and
small business systems showed similar trends in the rates of UDE manifestation. The rates
of manifestation vary in a manner consistent with Table 4.3 illustrating that workload does
have an effect on the rate of UDE manifestation, but for the workloads and systems tested,
varying the workload still yields a rate of undetected data corruption events within the same
order of magnitude.
Table 4.6: Estimated mean interval between undetected data corruption events for all
systems under the Abstract workload, with and without mitigation, derived from Table 4.4.
Mean Interval
System Mitigation 10−11 10−12 10−13
Large No 18.43 days 184.2 days 5.04 years
Large Yes 13.13 years 128.6 years 1258 years
Ent. No 35.98 days 0.9854 years 9.844 years
Ent. Yes 25.19 years 251.3 years 2531 years
Small No 1.576 years 15.76 years 157.6 years
Small Yes 399.9 years 4030 years 40358 years
4.6 Conclusions
Our results indicate that UDEs will continue to grow in their importance to system designers
as storage systems continue to scale, a conclusion which seems affirmed out by field observa-
tion of UDEs in modern large scale storage systems. Even in the case of the small business
system simulated, the rate of data corruption events without implementing mitigation is
such that one would expect to see UDEs occurring in a population of such storage systems,
and if we assume a UDE/IO rate of 10−11, the rate is high enough to push the mean interval
between undetected data corruption below the average lifetime of even a single such system.
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Our results suggest that data scrubbing on a weekly schedule is not enough to reduce
UDEs sufficiently, as the data scrub must be processing the location on a disk where the
UDE has occurred after the time at which the disk suffered the fault, and prior to the next
read request for that location. It is particularly telling that when the rate is set at 10−12
UDEs/IO, the rate of UDEs/IO estimated for near-line disks, both enterprise and large scale
systems have rates of undetected data corruption which place the mean interval between such
events at less than a year. Given the growing practice of utilizing cheaper near-line drives in
a RAID configuration, this highlights an important limitation of RAID. Since RAID5 and
RAID6 can only detect errors on the data drives during a parity scrub, the protection they
implement is largely orthogonal to the issues posed by UDEs. Fortunately, our simulations
suggest that by using relatively simple techniques such as the sequence number approach to
mitigation modeled in this work and described in [40], UDEs can largely be eliminated for
the expected lifetime of near-future systems. While they double the requirement for read
operations, requiring reading both the data and the parity, these methods reduce the rate
of undetected data corruption events by two to three orders of magnitude.
We consider in this chapter only a single mitigation technique, and a set of relatively
simple RAID based systems. Additionally, it is difficult to evaluate the correctness of our
measures given that our multi-modal simulator utilizes a variety of techniques for solution,
and only systems which can be trivially decomposed can be solved with these methods. In
Chapter 5 we will outline a modeling language for describing storage systems, and method for
identifying and categorizing complex dependence relationships within our models. Combined
with information about the fault and recovery events within a given system, we will propose
an algorithm for solving these models using a hybrid simulator which is more general than
the one defined in this Chapter. In Chapter 6 we will expand our model to include all of the
faults defined in Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 5
ANALYZING DEPENDENCE RELATIONSHIPS IN
STORAGE SYSTEMS
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, we introduced methods for building component-based models of storage sys-
tems and simulating them using empirical data. In Chapter 3, we discussed classes of faults
that were less significant in smaller systems, but which have become relevant to modern sys-
tems as they continue to increase in scale. Chapter 4 presented an initial attempt to model
those faults in component-based models when the models themselves are easily decompos-
able. The effect those faults have on storage systems is often more complex, especially when
considered along with additional complications, such as data deduplication. In this chap-
ter, we will detail a method for analyzing more complex models that cannot be trivially
decomposed, and that represent larger more complex systems.
Like all large and complex systems, the systems we address present significant problems for
modelers. Large systems present challenges for numerical solution, and though simulation
can be used even for infinite state spaces, solution time grows with the number of events
that must be processed. Because the faults we have defined have rates many orders of
magnitude smaller than those of our I/O processes and mitigation methods, we will call
them rare events. Models that contain rare events are often deemed stiff, meaning that
for the estimates of the chosen metrics to converge, an increasing number of events must
be observed. Given the rarity of UDEs and LSEs, rare events are a particular problem for
large-scale storage systems.
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Deduplication Disk Pool
Files
Figure 5.1: Representation of a deduplicated storage system. Redundant data is identified
and eliminated, so that only unique data is stored.
5.2 Dependence in Storage Systems
Modern storage systems are often more complex than the simple system represented in
Chapter 4. Most modern systems utilize RAID to improve their fault tolerance. In these
cases, dependencies are created between disks in a RAID group. Parity drives have state
that depends on the states of other disks within the RAID group; upon a failure, the states
of all drives in the group are needed in order to re-create the lost drives.
Modern storage systems have begun using a technique known as deduplication to improve
storage efficiency. The growing use of deduplication introduces a new form of dependence,
which can potentially exist between any two disks in a deduplicated system. Deduplication
(Figure 5.1) operates by fingerprinting data that is being written to the storage system and
identifying sub-file chunks that already exist in the storage system, selecting those files for
deduplication. When a file is deduplicated, only a single copy is stored as a deduplicated
instance; a series of references to that instance are created for the additional copies iden-
tified. That creates dependence among the disks storing references, the disk storing the
deduplicated instance, and the other disks in the RAID group that stores the instance.
Data deduplication is increasingly being adopted to reduce the data footprint of backup
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and archival storage, and more recently has become available for near-line primary storage
controllers. Scale-out file systems are increasingly diminishing the silos between primary
and archival storage by applying deduplication to unified petabyte-scale data repositories
spanning heterogeneous storage hardware. Cloud providers are also actively evaluating dedu-
plication for their heterogeneous commodity storage infrastructures and ever-changing cus-
tomer workloads. A more detailed model of deduplication based on empirical data will be
presented in Chapter 6.
While these dependencies make models of the resulting storage systems necessarily more
complex than models of storage systems with no fault tolerance or data deduplication, we
note that these dependencies only effect metrics in certain situations. When concerning
ourselves with reliability analysis, we note that these dependencies can be ignored except in
the cases that a fault has occurred, causing the loss of a disk in a RAID unit, or the loss of a
referenced deduplicated instance. Given that these failures are several orders of magnitude
more rare than non-faulty events within the storage system, such as scrubbing, and I/O,
an assumption that the disks are in fact independent holds for much of the storage systems
lifetime. In this chapter we focus on ways to exploit this insight to achieve performance
gains when modeling storage systems.
5.3 Related Work
There has been limited work in the literature which attempts to model complex storage
systems in rich fault environments. In Chapter 6 we will discuss the state-of-the-art, and
why it has been insufficient to understand the effect of deduplication on fault-tolerance.
In this chapter, we present related modeling work from other domains that attempt to
tackle similar modeling and solution difficulties in more general systems as preparation for
introducing our framework and methods.
Rare events, despite the low probability of their occurrence, can have large impacts. As
systems increase in size and complexity, rare event failures pose increased risk when they
occur on a per-component basis. While such failures may still occur with the same proportion
to other events, large-scale HPC systems can be expected to suffer a number of rare events
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within their normal lifetimes [55]. Rare faults may also be important for safety-critical
systems in which they are still rare during the system life time as they can represent faults
which cause catastrophic data loss [40] or system failure.
Importance sampling attempts to reduce the variance of estimates of a model’s reward
variables through mathematical biasing of the simulation, increasing the proportion of rare
events witnessed. This is accomplished by biasing the distributions, yielding a biased estima-
tor. An appropriate must then be found to unbias the estimators [56, 57]. While importance
sampling can speed-up simulations of models that have rare events, choosing a set of biased
distributions and unbiasing functions for the estimators can prove difficult. Improper choices
may slow down the simulation, or worse (and perhaps more likely), yield incorrect estimators
for the performance variables.
Importance splitting biases the simulation to make rare events less rare using a different
approach. The state space is partitioned into a number of levels. A level contains those
states that form critical points on “important paths” in the simulation, i.e. which result
in an increased probability of witnessing a rare event. Simulation paths that reach a level
are split and re-sampled to increase the likelihood of witnessing a rare event. Trajectories
resulting from a split are correlated, generating an unbiased estimator of the variance is
not straightforward. Selection of appropriate points to split and levels are model-specific
problems which can impact the efficiency of solutions using this technique [58, 59].
Decomposition offers an approach for large, complex systems, dividing them into smaller
submodels and finding solutions for the submodels separately. Models which cannot be
broken into wholly independent submodels must also have their interactions characterized.
If the submodels are weakly coupled, they may be sometimes be considered as a composition
of nearly independent submodels [60, 61].
5.4 Modeling Preliminaries
We present our method in the context of a generic model specification language based on
the notation presented in [62]. This is intended as an alternative to presenting our results
in a specific formalism, both to simplify the discussion of our techniques and to generalize
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our methods.
Definition 1. A model is a 5-tuple (S,E,Φ,Λ,∆)
• S is a finite set of state variables {s1, s2, . . . , sn} that take values in N.
• E is a finite set of events, {e1, e2, . . . , em} that may occur in the model.
• Φ : E × N1 × N2 × . . .× Nn → {0, 1} is the event-enabling function specification. For
each event e ∈ E, and any set of state variables and their assignments, q (represented
by an ordered set of natural numbers), event e is enabled and may occur for this set of
state variable assignments iff Φ(e, q) = 1.
• Λ : E × N1 × N2 × . . .× Nn → (0,∞) is the transition rate function specification. For
each event e, and set of state variables and their assignments, q, event e occurs with
rate Λ(e, q) when the state variables of the model have the values given in q.
• ∆ : E × N1 × N2 × . . . × Nn → N1 × N2 × . . . × Nn is the state variable transition
function specification. For each event e ∈ E, and each set of state variables and their
assignments q ∈ N1 × N2 × . . . × Nn, ∆(e, q) → q
′ defines the values assigned to all
state variables of the model when e occurs.
Definition 2. The state of a model M is a mapping ψ : S → N, where for all s ∈ S, ψ(s) is
the value of the state variable s. Ψ = {ψ|ψ : S → N} is the set of all such mappings.
A trajectory, or behavior of a model, is described as a finite sequence of states and events.
The model is assumed to be in some initial state, with events occurring with a rate de-
termined by λ. When an event fires, the model transitions in accordance with the state
transition function δ. The probability of transitioning from some arbitrary state, ψi, to
a particular next state, ψj is the probability that an event e is the next event such that
δ(ψi, e) = ψj. We calculate this probability as:
P (ψi → ψj) =
∑
e∈E|δ(e,ψi)=mj
λ(e, ψi)∑
e∈E|φ(e,ψi)=1
λ(e, ψi)
. (5.1)
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In addition to specifying a model of system, one must specify the performability, availabil-
ity, or dependability measures for a model. These measures are specified in terms of reward
variables [63]. Reward variables are specified as a reward structure [64] and a variable type.
Definition 3. Given model M = (S,E,Φ,Λ,∆), we define two reward structures: rate
rewards and impulse rewards.
• A rate reward is defined as a function R : P(S,N)→ R, where for q ∈ P(S,N), R(q)
is the reward accumulated when for each (s, n) ∈ q the marking of s is n.
• An impulse reward is defined as a function I : E → R, where for e ∈ E, I(e) is the
reward earned upon completion of e.
where P(S,N) is the set of all partial functions between S and N.
Definition 4. Let ΘM = {θ0, θ1, . . .} be a set of reward variables, each with reward structure
R or I associated with a model M .
The type of a reward variable determines how the reward structure is evaluated, and can
be defined over an interval of time, an instant of time, or in steady state, as shown in [65, 63].
5.4.1 Instant-of-Time Variables
We refer to variables which are used to measure the behavior of a model at a particular time
t as instant-of-time variables [66, 63]. Such a variable, θ(t) is defined as:
θt =
∑
ν∈P(S,N)
R(ν) · Iνt +
∑
e∈E
I(e) · Iet (5.2)
where
• Iνt is an indicator random variable which represents the instance of a SAN in a marking
such that for each (s, n) ∈ ν, the state variable s has a value of n at time t.
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• Iet is an indicator random variable which represents the instance of an event e that has
fired most recently at time t.
If the indicator random variables converge in distribution as t→∞, we consider θt to be
in “steady state”. We can then evaluate the steady state reward at an instant of time t with
the variable defined as
θt→∞ =
∑
ν∈P(S,N)
R(ν) · Iνt→∞ +
∑
e∈E
I(e) · Iet→∞ (5.3)
where
• Iνt→∞ is an indicator random variable which represents the instance of a SAN in a
marking such that for each (s, n) ∈ ν, the state variable s has a value of n in steady
state.
• Iet→∞ is an indicator random variable which represents the instance of an event e that
has fired most recently in steady state.
5.4.2 Interval-of-Time Variables
In order to calculate metrics which accumulate over some fixed interval of time, we use
interval-of-time variables. Such variables accumulate reward during some interval of time,
and take on the value of the total reward for the defined period [66, 63]. Given such a
variable, θ[t,t+l], we define it as:
θ[t,t+l] =
∑
ν∈P(S,N)
R(ν) · Jν[t,t+l] +
∑
e∈E
I(e) ·N e[t,t+l] (5.4)
where
• Jν[t,t+l] is a random variable which represents the total time the model spent in a marking
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such that for each (s, n) ∈ ν, the state variable s has a value of n during the period
[t, t+ l].
• Iet→∞ is an random variable which represents the number of times an event e has during
the period [t, t + l].
5.4.3 Time-Averaged Interval-of-Time Variables
The final type of reward variables we will consider are time-averaged interval-of-time vari-
ables. These variables quantify accumulated reward averaged over some interval of time
[66, 63]. Given such a variable, θ′[t,t+l] we define it as:
θ′[t,t+l] =
θ[t,t+l]
l
(5.5)
5.5 Dependence in Storage Systems
In Chapter 6 we will attempt to develop a good understanding on the reliability of systems
which use deduplication, which has to date been a difficult task for system designers [22].
Deduplication itself poses two potential reliability problems. First as illustrated in Figure
5.2a, the fact that chunks in several files depend on a single instance means that loss of a
instance causes secondary losses across the data store. Inversely, as shown in Figure 5.2b,
files with multiple references to different chunks may be dependent on the reliability of
multiple storage devices. If any one of the devices upon which it depends fails, the file itself
is lost. This additional dependence may be counter-balanced, however, depending on the
degree of additional storage efficiency. By decreasing the number of disks in the system with
deduplication, we decrease the number of expected disk faults as well. Understanding these
complex relationships requires understanding the nature of deduplication itself, as well as
the complex interactions created by the underlying storage system.
In order to properly exploit the dependence relationships present in a modeled storage
system, we must first establish an understanding of the types of relationships in which we
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Figure 5.2: Deduplication example showing the dependence of multiple references to the
same chunk in multiple files to a single stored reference and in a file to multiple disks in
the data store.
66
are interested. Our goal is to identify and exploit structural properties in such a model,
primarily failures due to disk failure, LSEs or UDEs, and recovery actions which remove
these failures. Our hypothesis is that failures create important dependence relationships
within the model, causing us to evaluate otherwise independent submodels as a larger model.
We hypothesize that repair actions break these dependencies, until the next failure occurs.
Furthermore, we are interested in failure and repair actions that represent rare-events.
5.5.1 RAID-Induced Dependence
Under normal operating conditions, the components of a storage system can be considered
largely independent. Given the assumption of uniform file placement on the system (as is
typical for large-scale general purpose machines), files are read and written to drives in an
independent fashion. In such cases the system might be modeled more tractably as a set
of independent systems, with each system solved individually. The use of RAID, however,
implies a dependence between some sub-systems in the case of a failure. Should two drives
suffer partial or total failure, they can no longer be treated as independent if they belong to
the same RAID group, until the failure is repaired.
Once a failure has occurred, the entire RAID group must be considered dependent as
further failures directly impact the integrity of files in the RAID group. This dependence
can be removed once successfully recover actions have repaired all failures within the RAID
group, allowing the disks in the group to once again be considered independent.
5.5.2 Deduplication Induced Dependence
An additional form of dependence in storage systems are those caused by deduplication.
When a failure occurs for a chunk which stores an instance of a deduplicated resource in
the storage system, a dependence is created for all references to that chunk, and the other
disks in the failed instances RAID group. Should the RAID suffer additional failures which
make the instance unrecoverable, all references to the instance will also be unrecoverable.
As before, recovery of the failed instance and repair eliminates this dependence.
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5.5.3 Important Events
For both of the major sources of dependence, an important point is that the events that
cause and remove dependence are rare events. Faults of interest occur rarely in the system,
because of the rates used by the models that represent them. Repair actions, while having
rates that are relatively fast compared to that of failures, can only occur when a fault has
changed system state. Thus, they are rare due to their enabling conditions, which are rarely
met. In later sections, we will analyze rare events along with dependence relationships to
form a strategy for solving our systems.
5.6 Understanding Dependence Relationships
The dependence relationships described for storage systems, using RAID and deduplication
seem similar, in concept, to the idea of near-independence [67]. In order to better characterize
the dependence relationships present in models of storage systems we discuss notions of
dependence used in studies of near-independence. Characterizing the dependence of multiple
portions of a model is complex, and involves development of a measure of how far the model
is from an ideal set of truly independent models. For that reason, using the terminology
discussed in [67], we will simply present a qualitative discussion of structures that can arise.
We represent our formalism, in Figure 5.3a, using circles for state variables and squares
for events. Dependencies are shown using directed arcs. In Figure 5.3a, we have a model
with state variables s0, s1, s2, and s3 and events e0, e1, e2, and e3. While the state of the
submodel constructed from state variables s0, s1 does not depend directly on events fired by
the second submodel (which is constructed of state variables s2, s3), it can still depend on
the state of the other submodel in two key ways.
• Rate dependence: The two submodels can be said to have rate dependence if the
transition rate function Λ of an event in one submodel is defined in terms of the state
variables in the other submodel. For example, we might define the rate function of e1
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Figure 5.3: Two examples of near-independent submodels.
in Figure 5.3a as follows.
Λ(e1, s2 = 0) → x
Λ(e1, s2 6= 0) → y
Even though the firing of events in a given submodel cannot affect the state variables
of another submodel, the rate of the event of one submodel is dependent on the state
variables of another submodel.
• External dependence: When an event in one submodel has an event-enabling function,
Φ, defined in terms of the state or state variables of another submodel, we say the
submodels feature external dependence. For example, we might define the rate function
of e1 in Figure 5.3a as follows.
Φ(e1, s2 < x) → 0
Φ(e1, s2 ≥ x) → 1
Again, even though the firing of events in a given submodel cannot affect the state
variables of another submodel, e1 cannot fire, unless the other submodel has s2 ≥ x.
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The enabling conditions of an e1 are dependent on the state of s2.
A third type of structure, synchronization dependence (which we call ∆-dependence, is
discussed in [67]. It corresponds to simultaneous changes in the values of two or more state
variables in two or more submodels. We expand upon this notion in light of our concern
with rare faults to describe a new structural feature, illustrated in Figure 5.3b.
• ∆-dependence: When the firing of an event changes the value of state variables in two
or more otherwise independent submodels, we say that they feature ∆-dependence.
While the submodel shown in Figure 5.3b would not normally be considered near-independent,
if e4 and e5 represent rare events, the states of the two submodels depend on each other only
rarely, when those events fire. Assume that the initial state of the model is such that
s0 = s2 = 1, and s1 = s3 = 0. Assume that the rates of the events are not state-dependent,
and that events are enabled when a state variable for which they have an incoming arc is
greater than zero, and disabled otherwise. Also assume that the rates of e5 and e6 are several
orders of magnitude more rare than e0, e1, e2 and e3. Until e5 or e6 fires, the model in Figure
5.3b will behave just like the model in Figure 5.3a under the same initial conditions and
assumptions about the events. However, once either e5 or e6 fires, the model will change so
that one submodel is disabled and inactive with s2+ s3 = 0, while the other has s0+ s1 = 2.
This will remain true, and the two submodels will be independent of one another, until either
e5 or e6 fires again, returning the system to one that resembles 5.3a again, with s0 + s1 = 1
and s2 + s3 = 1.
Dependencies between submodels result from direct dependencies between events and
states, or from indirect dependencies resulting from a sequence of direct dependencies. Each
direct dependence can be classified as a rate dependence, an external dependence, or a
∆-dependence.
Recall from Definition 3 in Section 5.4 that a reward variable may have one of two reward
structures, rate reward or impulse reward; this implies a final category of dependence.
• Reward dependence: When a reward variable θi ∈ ΘM exists such that its reward
structure is defined in terms of the state variables of two submodels, or in terms of the
events of two submodels, we say they feature reward dependence.
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Unlike the other forms of dependence we have defined, reward dependence is more likely to
inhibit decomposition of our model into submodels, for reasons that will become apparent
in Section 5.8.
5.6.1 Model Dependency Graph
Now that we have identified general ways in which submodels can be related, we define a
way to codify these relationships by constructing a model dependency graph (MDG). We will
use an MDG in conjunction with rare events found in the model via the methods discussed
in Section 5.7 as inputs to an algorithm we introduce in Section 5.8, to provide a proposed
decomposition of M .
Definition 5. The MDG of a model M is defined as an undirected labeled graph, GM =
(V,A, L), where V is a set of vertices composed of three subsets V = VS ∪ VE ∪ VΘ, A is a
set of arcs connecting two vertices such that one vertex is always an element of the subset
VS and one vertex is always an element of the subset VE, or one vertex is of the subset VΘ
while the other is of the set {VE ∪VS}, and L is a set of labels applied to elements of A from
the set {Φ,Λ,∆, R}. Let VS denote the subset of vertices representing the state variables
S ∈M ; VE denote the subset of vertices representing the events E ∈M , and VΘ denote the
subset of vertices representing reward variables from ΘM .
We construct GM using the model specification from Definition 1 of a model M , from
Section 5.4. GM has a node for every state variable in S and event in E, and reward variable
in ΘM , with arcs connecting an arbitrary state variable si to an arbitrary event ej, iff
• The enabling condition of ej depends on the value of si. This indicates an external
dependence and is marked with the label Φ.
• The rate of the event ej depends on the value of si. This represents a rate dependence
and is marked with the label Λ.
• The firing of ej changes the value of si. This represents a ∆ dependence and is marked
with the label ∆.
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Figure 5.4: Two examples of near-independent submodels.
An arc labeled R connects a node representing an element θi ∈ ΘM to a node representing
an element aj ∈ {S ∪ E} iff
• aj ∈ S and θi is a rate reward defined in terms of aj .
• aj ∈ E and θi is an impulse reward defined in terms of aj .
We represent an MDG graphically as shown in Figure 5.4. State variables are repre-
sented by circles, events by squares, and reward variables by diamonds. Arcs in an MDG
represent dependencies. As shown in Figure 5.4 rate dependencies are labeled Λ (a); exter-
nal dependencies are labeled with Φ (b); ∆-dependencies are labeled with ∆ (c); and rate
dependencies, whether impulse or rate rewards, are labeled with R (d,e).
Proposition 1. For a given model M , the graph GM represents all possible dependencies
between all events and state variables in a model.
Proof. Proof by contradiction. Suppose there exist some state si and some event ej that are
directly dependent and not captured by GM . All direct dependencies due to Φ,Λ, and ∆ are
encoded in GM as labeled edges thus, the dependence must be one outside of the definition
of Φ,Λ, and ∆. By definition 1, no such direct dependencies can exist. Thus our graph
represents all possible direct dependencies.
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Suppose there exist two elements α, β ∈ S ∪ E that are indirectly dependent and not
captured by the graph GM . They are indirectly dependent if they are both state variables
and the value of α can affect the value of β or vice versa. If α is a state variable and β is
an event, they are indirectly dependent if the firing of β can affect the value of α, or if the
value of α can affect the value of Φ(β, q),Λ(β, q), or ∆(β, q) for q ∈ N1 × N2 × . . .× Nn. If
α and β are both events, they are indirectly dependent if the firing of α can affect the value
of Φ(β, q),Λ(β, q), or ∆(β, q) and vice versa.
In the model this indirect dependency will take the form of a series of event firings and
state variable changes, each of which is either enabled by, or has its rates set by, a state
variable upon which it depends, and which changes the value of subsequent state variables
upon which future events depend. For such a sequence {si, ej, sk, el, . . .} to exist, every
consecutive pair in the sequence (si, ej), (ej, sk), (sk, el), . . . must be directly dependent. If
this is true, then there must exist a path defined by a series of vertices in V and arcs in A from
the vertex representing the starting state or event in the sequence, to the vertex representing
the final state or event in the sequence, such that path visits each vertex that corresponds
to intermediate states and events in the sequence. Therefore the indirect dependence of α
and β must be represented by the path of direct dependencies vα, vαvi, vi, . . . , vj, vjvβ , vβ,
and thus cannot exist.
5.7 Rare Events in Storage Systems
The dependence relationships of interest are those which become important when a fault
occurs, and can be ignored again when a fault is repaired. In both instances, faults, and
repairs, the action which changes the importance of the dependence relationship can be
classified as a rare event. In the case of failures, the event is rare because its rate is very
low, compared to other events in the system. In the case of repair actions, the event is rare
because it is only enabled when a fault has occurred in the system.
In order to find a way to decompose a storage model, we could require the user to specify
the failure and repair actions in the model, as with the decomposition methods presented by
[67]. Ideally, however, we wish to be able to identify these events without user input. The
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Figure 5.5: Models exhibiting rare events due to competition.
characteristics that set these events apart from others in the model is that they are rare.
5.7.1 Identifying Rare Events
In order to find the events which represent whole disk faults, LSEs and UDEs, we need to
identify events which are “locally rare.” An event ei, Λ(ei, q) may be defined such that it’s
rate is much less than that of other events in the model, i.e. Λ(ei, q) < µmax∀q. In these cases
we can classify the local rate of ei to be rare. In the case of an event with a state-dependent
rate (i.e., where Λ(ei, q) varies for different q), it may be useful to create two virtual events,
ei,1 and ei,2, with the first virtual event replacing ei for values of Λ(ei, q) that constitute
non-rare events, and ei,2 replacing ei for values that qualify as representing rare events.
For our deduplication system, these locally rare rates which have Λ(ei, q) < µmax∀q, play
a part in identifying rare events in the case of total disk failures, initial latent-sector errors,
and undetected disk errors. These events have rates which are rare compared to others
within the model, based simply on the evaluation of their rate function Λ(ei, q).
Figure 5.5 illustrates an example in which the local rates defined by the transition rate
function does not differentiate rare events from non-rare events. Assume that the rate of
the event labeled e0 is defined as Λ(e0, q) = µ, ∀q, and that the events labeled e1, e2, e3 have
rates defined as Λ(ei, q) = µ, ∀q as well. Considering the case when the enabling function is
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Figure 5.6: Models exhibiting rare events due to rare enabling conditions.
defined for all events except e0 as
Φ(ei, s0) =

 1, if s0 > 10, otherwise
and the state transition function is defined in part by ∆(ei, (s0 = 1)) = (s0 = 0).
If we imagine a similar case in which n such events are in competition, their effective rates
might be much lower than the local rates defined in Λ would imply. The effective rate of
each event can be easily determined using uniformization.
The final, and potentially most difficult to identify, fashion in which events may be rare is
when their enabling conditions defined by Φ are rare. Despite the difficulty in finding such
events, they are important as they represent recovery/repair actions, among other things.
Consider the model presented in Figure 5.6. Assume that all events labeled either e or r
have the same transition rate function, and that the model begins with state variables s0
and s4 equal to one, with all other state variables equal to zero. An event is enabled when
all state variables with outgoing arcs pointing to the event have values greater than zero,
and disabled otherwise. When an event fires, it decrements by one all state variables with
outgoing arcs at the event, and increments by one all state variables with incoming arcs.
Although the rates of all events are similar, the enabling conditions of the events labeled r
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are true far less often than those of the events labeled e. They require that the submodels be
“synchronized,” i.e., that s2 = s7 = 1 in order to fire. The enabling condition for the second
r requires that s8 = 1, a condition only true after the firing of a rare event, and before any
other events have been fired. These events are rare because their enabling conditions depend
on a model state that is rare.
It is important to identify events representing recovery, mitigation, and propagation as well
as faults. The difficulty is that recovery actions have high rates compared to most failures.
However, since they are not enabled unless a failure has occurred, they are dependent on a
rare enabling condition. Latent sector errors also partially fall into this category. While an
initial LSE is defined by a locally rare rate, studies [10] have shown that there is a period
afterwords during which they become frequent. This precondition of a recent LSE creates a
condition where an otherwise common event, is rare due to the state in which it is common
being rare.
We combine these notions of how an event might qualify as rare by calculating the effective
global rate of an event. For an event ei we solve for the global rate µei, given a specification
of the form presented in Definition 1 and Definition 2 from Section 5.4, along with pi∗, the
steady-state occupancy probability vector, as follows:
µei =
∑
∀ψj |φ(ei,ψj)=1
λ(ei, ψj)
(
λ(ei, ψj)∑
∀e∈E|φ(e,ψj)=1
)
· pi∗[ψj ] (5.6)
While λ and φ in equation 5.6 are given by the model definition, pi∗ is not. In fact, solving
for pi∗ can be difficult, potentially as difficult as solving for the original model itself.
5.7.2 Identifying Recovery Actions
While calculation of all rare enabling conditions is a difficult problem, we can use domain
knowledge of storage system reliability models to aid us in finding certain classes of rare
enabling conditions. As we noted before, recovery actions are by necessity paired with a
previous fault in the model. Without a fault, the state variables in the model can not have
values such that the recovery action can fire, and so recovery actions directly depend on rare
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events. By analyzing the dependence relationships in our model we can identify these rare
events given the assumption that our model begins with no initial faults.
In the next section we will introduce a method for decomposing models with rare events.
Using the algorithms introduced in Section 5.8 we will show how to identify recovery, miti-
gation, and fault propagation events.
5.7.3 Partitioning
We identify a certain subset ER ⊂ E as rare events, given some partitioning scheme, as
first discussed in Section 5.7.1. Choice of a static parameter with which to partition has
been well-studied for hybrid simulation [68]. Some algorithms even propose methods for
dynamic partitioning while simulating a given system [69]. The exact choice of partitioning
method is unimportant for the correctness of the general application of our technique, but
some approaches may have advantages when applied to specific models. In general, for the
models we have studied, it has been appropriate to assume a static partitioning parameter
µmax. In practice, choice of a value for µmax is simple, as fault events are many orders of
magnitude rarer than non-fault events. Two clusters of rates were easily identified using
k-means clustering with two clusters, for the fault models defined in Chapter 3 and Chapter
6. Given a value for µmax, we find those events ei ∈ E for which Λ(ei, q) < µmax∀q and
define the set of these events as ER. This partitioning identifies those rare events that are
rare due to a locally rare rate, or competition; it will allow us to identify those rare events
that represent mitigation and fault propagation using the methods we will present in Section
5.8.
5.8 Decomposing Models with Rare Events
Using an MDG, we have shown how to represent all dependencies in a model of a storage
system, and we have identified a subset of rare events within the model, which include
failures and repair events. In this section we present an algorithm for decomposing M ,
using the MDG generated from M , GM . M will be decomposed into a set of n submodels
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Figure 5.7: Overview of solution Method
Ξ = {ξ0, ξ1, . . . , ξn} that can be considered independent in the absence of the firing of a rare
event. We also discuss how to repartitionM using GM after a rare event has fired, producing
a new set of independent submodels, as illustrated in Figure 5.7. When visualizing our
simulation as a time-line, as shown in Figure 5.8, we represent the firing of a rare event with
the symbol τ . Each time a rare event fires, it results in a reevaluation of our decomposition
of M , represented in Figure 5.7 as τ . Given a model and a set of reward variables, we
generate an MDG and a set of identified rare events, ER. Using the MDG, GM , the set of
rare events, ER, and the current values of all state variables in the model M , we produce
τ τ τ
Figure 5.8: Model repartition after each rare event.
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a decomposition of the model M into a set of submodels ΞR and Ξ!R. From ΞR, Ξ!R, and
the subset ΞER ∈ Ξ of all submodels (in both ΞR and Ξ!R) that contain events in ER, we
produce two new sets of submodels:
ΞSim = ΞR ∪ (Ξ!R ∩ ΞER) (5.7)
ΞNum = Ξ!R \ (Ξ!R ∩ ΞER). (5.8)
The submodels in the sets ΞSim and ΞNum will then be passed to an appropriate solution
method and solved until a rare event fires, at which point we repeat the decomposition step
based on the new state of the model.
By decomposing our model in this fashion, we hope to remove from consideration events
for which there is no current direct or indirect dependency from our reward variables in
the absence of a rare event firing. In order to form this decomposition, however, we must
analyze the dependencies in GM , and from the results of that analysis form a decomposed
model dependency graph G′M that can be used to identify a submodel decomposition of
M . We form a decomposed model dependency graph G′M for M by first removing all ∆-
dependencies that involve events in ER. For every vertex associated with a state variable
whose only ∆-dependencies involve events in ER, we replace those vertices with new vertices
from a set VC , which represent constant state variables whose values are equal to their initial
conditions. All vertices that represent events with rates dependent on state variables that
are now represented by constant vertices are examined. If such events have transition rate
function specifications such that Λ(e, q) = 0 for all q ∈ N1×N2× . . .×Nn given VC , or have
enabling function specifications such that Φ(e, q) = 0 for all q given VC , they are removed.
All dependencies of removed events are also removed. The process is repeated, examining
all VS and VE iteratively until no new vertices are removed. This process for generating G
′
M
using GM and ER is presented in Algorithm 1.
The graph G′M that results from the application of Algorithm 1 to GM and ER is then
used to determine if a valid partition of the model M exists for our technique. If G′M defines
multiple unconnected sub-graphs, G′M = {g
′
0 ∪ g
′
1 ∪ . . .}, a valid partition exists. If it does
not, our technique is not applicable. The sub-graphs of G′M correspond to the submodels in
79
Algorithm 1 Remove rare-event-based dependencies from G′M .
G′M = (V
′, A′, L′)← GM
P ← ER
while P 6= ∅ do
Remove all edges in A′ containing at least one vertex in P . Do not remove vertices with edges
labeled Φ or Λ if the vertex is in ER.
P ← ∅
for all vi ∈ V
′
S do
if !∃vivj ∈ A
′ such that vivj has label ∆ then
V ′ ← V ′ \ vi
Create a new constant vertex vci ∈ VC
V ′ ← V ′ ∪ vci
Associate a value equal to the initial marking of si ∈ S associated with vi with vci
end if
end for
for all vj ∈ V
′
E do
if ∃vi|vivj ∈ A
′ labeled Φ such that vi ∈ VC then
if !∃q consistent with the constant markings associated with vertices in VC and Φ(ej, q) = 1
then
P ← P ∪ vj
end if
end if
if ∃vi|vivj ∈ A
′ labeled Λ such that vi ∈ VC then
if !∃q consistent with the constant markings associated with vertices in VC and Λ(ej , q) 6= 0
then
P ← P ∪ vj
end if
end if
end for
V ′ ← V ′ \ P
end while
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Figure 5.9: Example decomposition of a model dependency graph GM to G
′
M .
our partition Ξ. For a given sub-graph, g′i = (V
′
i , A
′
i), for each v
′
j ∈ V
′
i such that v
′
j ∈ VS,
we add the corresponding state variable to ξi. For each v
′
j ∈ V
′
i such that v
′
j ∈ VE, we add
the corresponding event to ξi. In addition, for each ξi ∈ Ξ we restrict the definitions of
Φ(ej , q),Λ(ej, q), and ∆(ej , q) to ej ∈ ξi and q ∈ N1,N2, . . . ,N|Sξi | such that Sξi ∈ ξi.
To further explain our decomposition algorithm, we present an example model dependency
graph and its decomposition in Figure 5.9. We assume that the event represented by the
vertex e2 is a rare event in the model. Applying algorithm 1, we begin with a set P = e2,
remove those edges labeled ∆ that involve e2, and clear P . We note that the state variable
represented by s2 remains constant in the absence of e2’s ∆ edge, and replace it with a
constant vertex c2 with a value equal to its initial conditions. We then find that events
e3 and e4 have dependencies that are marked by Φ labeled as arcs, indicating an external
dependency. Assume that the enabling conditions of e3 are not met by the constant value
of c2, but the enabling conditions of e4 are met. We add e3 to the now-empty P and iterate
again, this time removing e3. We do not remove s3, despite the ∆-dependency, as s3 has
an additional ∆-dependency on e4. At this point, P is empty, and we exit the algorithm,
yielding G′M = G
′
0 ∪G
′
1.
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5.8.1 Mitigation, Recovery, and Propagation Events
In Section 5.7.2 we mentioned that by using methods discussed in this section, we would
be able to find mitigation, recovery and fault propagation events. Through execution of
Algorithm 1 onM , with state variables set to represent an initially fault-free model, removing
state variables and events in the manner described by Algorithm 1, it is guaranteed that
recovery, mitigation and propagation events will be removed. This is due to the fact that
the fault associated with those actions have yet to occur. Since recovery, mitigation and
propagation actions have a direct correspondence with faults in the system (giving them
their rare enabling conditions), in the absence of a fault, their enabling conditions cannot
be met by the constant placeholders we use to represent the effects of a fault event’s firing.
Thus those events will be removed during our decomposition step.
When Algorithm 1 is used, the set of all events added to P is the set of fault events in ER
plus any events that depend on ER; that represent recovery, mitigation, or fault propagation;
and that are added to ER when our model is being decomposed and solved during simulation.
An example of this procedure is illustrated in Appendix A.
5.8.2 Analyzing Reward Variable Dependencies
It is important to note that reward variable dependencies were preserved in G′M . These
dependencies prevent decomposition of otherwise independent sub-graphs by maintaining
connectivity based on reward dependence and help us choose solution methods for submodels
in Ξ. Given some reward variable θi, during a given period of solution, the reward variable
may be evaluated for the solution period using only information on the state variables and
events contained in the submodel it belongs to in a decomposition of G′M .
Proposition 2. In the absence of the firing of a rare event, the reward variable θi is inde-
pendent from a submodel ξj if no direct dependence exists in G
′
M from θi to a vertex in g
′
j.
Proof. If a direct dependence existed between a reward variable θi and a state or event in
ξj then G
′
M would have an edge connecting θi to a vertex in g
′
j, and a path would exist. If
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there were an indirect dependency between θi and a vertex in g
′
j, then a path would exist
between a vertex vk that has a direct dependency with θi and a vertex in g
′
j . Then vk would
be a vertex in g′j, and θi would have an edge connecting directly to a vertex in g
′
j .
Given G′M , we divide all submodels in Ξ defined by the independent sub-graphs of G
′′
M
into two sets: those upon which reward variables do and do not depend in the absence of
rare events. These sets of submodels are called ΞR and Ξ!R, respectively.
5.9 Solving the Decomposed Model
A variety of solution techniques can be used to solve a decomposable storage system model
once the dependencies have been identified and relevant decomposition events, both failures
and repair events, have been found. We present in this section an algorithm for hybrid
simulation of decomposed models, and a discussion of complementary solution methods
from the literature. Our hybrid simulation algorithm was designed to help us study the
dependability characteristics of deduplicated data storage systems. In Chapter 6, we will
use these methods to solve a real system and will present the results of our solution.
5.9.1 Hybrid Simulation of Rare-Event Decomposed Systems
Our study of rare-event-based decomposition methods was motivated by a desire to study
the dependability characteristics of storage systems that utilize data deduplication, in a fault
environment characterized by rare events. In order to estimate the value of reward variables
defined for models of these systems, we have employed our decomposition methods and a
hybrid simulation algorithm.
When solving our model, we view trajectories of model execution as a time series τ0 −→
τ1 −→ τ2 −→ τ3 −→ . . . where τ0 represents our start time, and each subsequent τi represents
the firing of a rare event. The set ΞSim has all submodels that contain either a rare event or a
reward dependency. The set ΞNum has all submodels that have neither rare events nor reward
dependencies. From Proposition 2, reward variable solution does not depend on ΞNum. Thus
we need only solve the state occupancy probability for all submodels in ΞNum at the time
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Algorithm 2 Hybrid Simulation of M
Given M,ΘM , GM and initial values for all state variables.
while ΘM not converged do
Generate G′M and Ξ from GM .
Derive ΞSim and ΞNum.
Simulate ΞSim until the next event is in the set ER.
Generate pi∗ξi for each submodel ΞNum.
Generate a random state for ξi ∈ ΞNum treating pi
∗
ξi
as the pmf of the random variable.
Recompose M . Simulate the next rare event in M .
Use current state of M as the next initial state.
end while
of the next rare event firing. We do so by making the assumption that the submodels enter
steady state between firings of rare events. This assumption seems appropriate for two
reasons. The first is the high probability of a long inter-event time between rare events. The
second relates to the fact that for the storage systems in which we are interested, systems
tend to enter into steady state instantly in the absence of rare events. The scrub process,
for example, is always in steady state; the same holds true for many recovery, propagation,
or mitigation submodels. Simulation of the model M is performed using Algorithm 2.
The general improvement offered by this algorithm comes from the reduction of events
that must be simulated in order to estimate the effect of rare events in the system. Bucklew
and Radeke [70] give a general rule of thumb that in order to estimate the impact of an
event with probability ρ, we must process approximately 100/ρ simulations. Our method
seeks to reduce the number of events that must processed for each computed trajectory by
eliminating those events that cannot impact ΘM without the firing of a rare event.
The performance improvement offered by this algorithm varies with the model and with
the degree of dependence of the state variables and events in the model. For models whose
resulting Ξ do not have the proper structure, our proposed hybrid simulator may provide
no improvement. Between firings of a rare event, our method will produce a speed-up
proportional to the rate at which we remove events from explicit simulation. Thus given
E ′ as the set of all events ei ∈ ΞNum ∪ ej ∈ M such that ej /∈ Ξ, our improvement is
proportional to
∑
ei∈E
′ λ(ei,ψi)
∑
ei∈E
λ(ei,ψi)
, ∀ψi ∈ Ψ. This improvement is due to the removal of events
that, while enabled, cannot change the state of our model in a way that influences our reward
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variables. For instance, a write process may still be enabled, but in the absence of a UDE
the write process cannot result in the propagation of a UDE to parity. Likewise while it is
important to represent the position of the scrub process, it cannot result in mitigation of a
fault until a fault is present to mitigate. By removing those events from our simulator, we
improve the efficiency of our solution.
5.9.2 Required Assumptions
A key assumption of our solution method is that the storage sub-models reach steady state
between rare events. For the storage systems of interest, the initial transient period is
not part of the system lifetime during production. We consider the initial state of any
storage system to be fault-free and with uniform distribution of files across the storage
system itself. The steady state of such a system can be considered this fault-free condition,
with the placement of files described by the observed empirical distribution used to model
deduplication.
Other sub-models that are likely to be considered independent, such as the model of the
scrub process, are characterized by periodic processes that are either unperturbed by rare
events in the system, or dormant in the absence of faults. Thus, any system that is not
currently composed with another system that contains a failure can be said to be in steady
state.
5.9.3 Correctness of Reward Variables
In this section, we show the three types of reward variables defined in Section 5.4. We redefine
these reward variables for use with our decomposition algorithm and hybrid solution method,
described previously. We demonstrate that the resulting reward variables are equivalent to
those defined in Section 5.4.
When solving for instant-of-time variables, we use the same equation given in Section 5.4:
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Figure 5.10: Comparison of instant-of-time reward variable solutions.
θt =
∑
ν∈P(S,N)
R(ν) · Iνt +
∑
e∈A
I(e) · Iet (5.9)
We evaluate this variable in the same fashion for the submodel that contains the necessary
state variables to establish each ν ∈ P(S,N) and each e ∈ A.
Proposition 3. For a given model M , a decomposed MDG G′M , and an instant-of-time
reward variable θt, solving for θt using Equation 5.9, and the appropriate submodel decom-
position proposed by G′M yields the same result as the original model M .
Proof. From Proposition 2 we know that the reward variable θt is independent from a sub-
model ξj at time t if no direct dependence exists in G
′
M from θt to a vertex in g
′
j. Thus
the solution at time t for θt for our decomposed submodels is the same as the solution for
M .
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Because of our method of forming an MDG, reward dependencies will exist between a
variable and all state variables and events, ensuring that the submodel is decomposed in
such a way that the resulting submodel contains everything necessary to evaluate θt, as
illustrated in Figure 5.10. As shown, at the time we evaluate our reward variable, t, all
state variables and rewards on which our reward variable depends at time t are in the same
submodel as the reward variable.
To solve for interval-of-time variables using our hybrid solution method, we must provide
a new method of computation. Recall from Section 5.4 that an interval-of-time variable
θ[t,t+l] is defined as follows:
θ[t,t+l] =
∑
ν∈P(S,N)
R(ν) · Jν[t,t+l] +
∑
e∈A
I(e) ·N e[t,t+l] (5.10)
We modify the computation of interval-of-time variables to accommodate our solution
technique by using multiple random variables for Jν[t,t+l] and N
e
[t,t+l] based on the decompo-
sition and re-composition of the underlying model, as dictated by our solution techniques.
As shown in Figure 5.11 we have a set of n model decompositions that form intervals
defined by the times d0, d1, . . . , dn−1 during the period [t, t+ l]. For these intervals, we create
n+ 1 random variables to replace Jν[t,t+l] and N
e
[t,t+l]:
Jν[t,d0], J
ν
[d0,d1]
, . . . , Jν[dn−1,t+l]
N e[t,d0], N
e
[d0,d1]
, . . . , N e[dn−1,t+l]
Each of these random variables is equivalent to those from the previous definition, but over
a different interval of time.
The variables are distinguished by n + 1 separate intervals in the set
D = {[t, d0], [d0, d1], . . . , [dn−1, t+ l]}
Based on those identities, we redefine the method for calculating an interval-of-time variable
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for our solution method as follows:
Y[t,t+l] =
∑
ν∈P(S,N)
∑
d∈D
R(ν) · Jνd +
∑
e∈A
∑
d∈D
I(e) ·N ed (5.11)
The differences between that calculation and the one shown in Section 5.4 are illustrated
in Figure 5.11. In the original model, we use a single random variable for each rate and
impulse reward. Using our methods, however, we need one for each separate interval in D.
The two methods are actually equivalent, however, as the sum of the new indicator variables
yields the old indicator variables. The reason is that the decomposition algorithm we have
presented preserves reward dependencies.
Proposition 4. For a given model M , a set of decomposed MDGs Gˆ′M over the interval
[t, t + l], and an interval-of-time reward variable Y[t,t+l], solving for Y[t,t+l] using Equation
5.11 and the appropriate submodel decompositions for each interval in D yields the same
result as the original model M .
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Proof. Starting from the definition from Equation 5.11, we prove the equivalence of Y[t,t+l]
and θ[t,t+l] by construction.
Y[t,t+l] =
∑
ν∈P(S,N)
∑
d∈D
R(ν) · Jνd +
∑
e∈A
∑
d∈D
I(e) ·N ed (5.12)
=
∑
ν∈P(S,N)
R(ν)
∑
d∈D
Jνd +
∑
e∈A
I(e)
∑
d∈D
N ed (5.13)
Given Proposition 2, which states that all state variables and events required for calcu-
lating a reward variable are contained within the submodel containing the reward variable
itself, we have that:
Jν[t,t+l] =
∑
d∈D
Jνd (5.14)
N e[t,t+l] =
∑
d∈D
N ed (5.15)
The sums of our new indicator variables are the original indicator variables from Section
5.4. Thus,
Y[t,t+l] =
∑
ν∈P(S,N)
R(ν)Jν[t,t+l] +
∑
e∈A
I(e)N e[t,t+l] (5.16)
= θ[t,t+l]. (5.17)
Interval-of-time reward variables calculated with our method are equivalent to those cal-
culated with typical discrete event simulators.
For time-averaged interval-of-time variables, we redefine the variable as
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W[t,t+l] =
Y[t,t+l]
l
. (5.18)
The above calculation is similar to one given in Section 5.4, but uses the method for
calculating interval-of-time variables that takes into account the subdivisions of the interval
[t, t+ l] given by D.
Proposition 5. For a given model M , a set of decomposed MDGs Gˆ′M over the interval
[t, t+ l], and a time-averaged interval-of-time reward variable θ′[t,t+l], solving for W[t,t+l] using
Equation 5.18 and the appropriate submodel decompositions for each interval in D yields the
same result as the original model M .
Proof. Given equation 5.17, 5.18 is equivalent to the definition presented in Section 5.4. From
Equation 5.17, we know that Y[t,t+l] = θ[t,t+l]. Substituting θ[t,t+l] for Y[t,t+l] in Equation 5.18
yields Equation 5.5.
In this section we have detailed a method to identify all dependence relationships in a
model, M , using an MDG, GM . We then detailed how to identify rare faults in the model.
Using the set of identified faults, ER, and the MDG, we showed how to enlarge the set ER
to include mitigation, repair, and propagation actions. We then showed how to use ER with
GM to form a set of decomposed submodels, Ξ, which we then solved using Algorithm 2. In
the next chapter, we will use these methods to calculate reliability metrics for a real system
and draw conclusions about the impact of deduplication on the reliability of data.
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CHAPTER 6
ANALYZING THE RELIABILITY OF A
DEDUPLICATED STORAGE SYSTEM
6.1 Introduction
In Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 we have shown how to build models of complex systems using
a component-based methodology, provided detailed models of faults which impact modern
storage systems, and discussed methods for efficient solution of models based in these meth-
ods. In this chapter we apply the material of the previous chapters to a real deduplicated
file system in order to understand the impact of deduplication on the reliability of storage
systems.
6.2 Motivation
Data deduplication is increasingly being adopted to reduce the data footprint of backup
and archival storage, and more recently has become available for near-line primary storage
controllers. Scale-out file systems, highly scalable grid-based network-attached storage sys-
tems, are increasingly diminishing the silos between primary and archival storage by apply-
ing deduplication to unified petabyte-scale data repositories spanning heterogeneous storage
hardware. Cloud providers are also actively evaluating deduplication for their heterogeneous
commodity storage infrastructures and ever-changing customer workloads.
While the cost of data deduplication in terms of time spent on deduplicating and recon-
structing data is reasonably well understood [14, 15], its impact on data reliability is not,
especially in large-scale storage systems with heterogeneous hardware. Since traditional
deduplication keeps only a single instance of redundant data, it magnifies the negative im-
pact of data loss. Chunk-based deduplication [16, 5] divides a file into multiple chunks,
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meaning the loss of one chunk will create many lost chunks in the storage system. Delta
encoding [17, 19, 20, 21] deduplicates at the file level, storing the differences among files,
and creating the potential for losing multiple files when ever a file is lost.
Administrators and system architects have found that understanding the data reliability of
their system under deduplication to be important but extremely difficult [22]. Deduplication
itself poses two potential reliability problems. If any one of the devices upon which it
depends fails, the file itself is lost. This additional dependence may be counter-balanced,
however, depending on the degree of additional storage efficiency. By decreasing the number
of disks in the system with deduplication, we decrease the number of expected disk faults
as well. Understanding these complex relationships requires understanding the nature of
deduplication itself, as well as the complex interactions created by the underlying storage
system.
The existing literature relies on heuristics to address the issue of reliability in deduplication
systems; the key recommendation is to keep multiple copies of a data chunk instead of storing
only a single instance. The creators of Deep Store [5] proposed to determine the level of
redundancy for a chunk based on a user-assigned value of importance. It has been suggested
by D. Bhagwat et al. [16] that the number of replicas for a chunk should be proportional
to its reference count, i.e., the number of files sharing the chunk. A gap exists in the
current literature on the topic of quantifying the data reliability of a deduplication system
or providing a means to estimate whether a set of reliability requirements can be met in a
deduplication system.
A quantitative modeling of reliability in a deduplication system is nontrivial, even without
taking into account the petabyte scale of storage systems. First, there are different types of
faults in a storage system, including whole disk failures [41], latent sector errors (LSEs) [9,
10], and undetected disk errors [47, 40, 55]. To consider all these faults together, it is
necessary to have an understanding of how these faults manifest, and have a representative
model that takes into account dependencies and correlations with other, similar, faults as
well as the interactions of independent faults in the hardware environment. Second, these
faults can propagate due to the sharing of data chunks or chaining of files in a deduplication
system. In order to correctly understand the impacts of these faults and their consequences
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on the reliability of our storage system, we need to accurately model both the storage system
faults and faults due to data deduplication. We call storage system faults and faults due
to deduplication primary and secondary faults respectively, and discuss them in more detail
in Section 6.5. Third, it is important to note that many of the faults we wish to consider
are rare compared to other events in the system, such as disk scrubbing, disk rebuilds, and
I/O. Calculating the impact from rare events in a system can be computationally expensive,
motivating us to find efficient ways of measuring their effect on the reliability metrics of
interest.
The complexity of this problem arises from two different causes. The first is the state-
space explosion problem which can make numerical solution difficult. As our model grows
increasingly complex the state space grows rapidly. The simplified deduplication system
studied in [71] quickly grows to unmanageable size, having 1023 states with only 10 storage
subsystems, and 10222 states with 100 storage subsystems, exceeding the capabilities of
numerical solvers. A second issue comes from the stiffness that results from rare events. For
numerical solutions stiffness introduces numerical instability, making solution impractical.
When simulating stiffness increases the number of events we must process, causing a resulting
increase in simulation complexity. These factors, and a desire to precisely understand the
complex relationships present a need to use more sophisticated methods of analysis to fully
understand the implications of deduplication.
6.2.1 Our Contributions
In this chapter, we utilize the hybrid simulation approach detailed in Chapter 5 to quanti-
tatively analyze the reliability of a modeled deduplication system with heterogeneous data
on heterogeneous storage hardware, in the presence of primary faults and their secondary
effects due to deduplication. The analysis is based on three key dimensions that our model
takes into account:
• The fault tolerance characteristics of the underlying storage hardware.
• The statistical deduplication characteristics (e.g., reference count distribution) of a set
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of deduplicated data.
• The number of replicas of a given data chunk that are stored.
To validate our modeling approach, we studied data from an enterprise backup storage
system containing 7 terabytes of deduplicated data comprising over 2.7 million unique file
names and over 193 million references to 2.87 million unique deduplicated data chunks. We
analyzed the statistical properties of the real data, including the deduplication relationship
implied by references from each file to deduplicated chunks. To a user, different data sets
usually have different levels of importance and different reliability constraints. Treating all
files the same way is not the right strategy. Therefore, we break our analysis out into twelve
separate categories that are based on the file types and applications, characterizing each
category separately.
We derived a model of the data that has the same statistical characteristics as the original
data set, and evaluated the reliability impact of data deduplication on a variety of differ-
ent storage hardware with different reliability characteristics, different data categories with
different deduplication characteristics, and different numbers of replicas for deduplicated
chunks.
The primary goal of this chapter is to improve our understanding of deduplicated storage
systems. In doing so we also detail a modeling framework to evaluate the reliability of other
deduplication systems with varying hardware reliability characteristics, varying deduplica-
tion characteristics, and a varying number of copies of data chunks. We built our models
based on a given enterprise system using fault models described in the literature, but our
methods can be applied to other systems. In the remaining sections of this chapter, we will
not only show the results for this system we studied but detail the methods we used to model
this system given appropriate data, so that the same methods can easily be applied to other
systems.
We also provide a method for analyzing the effect of multi-copy deduplication on the
reliability of our studied storage system. We use our methods to determine the number of
copies of various data chunks or files needed to meet a specific reliability requirement while
minimizing storage utilization. For our system, we utilized category information along with
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reference counts to determine the importance of a deduplicated chunk. We believe that this
is preferable to methods based only on the reference count of the deduplicated chunk, as in
[5, 16].
In this chapter, we model oﬄine storage-side deduplication implemented through variable
chunk hashing. Our models can easily be extended to support other deduplication algo-
rithms, including fixed-size chunk hashing, whole file hashing, and delta encoding. Other
deduplication architectures can also be easily modeled, such as online storage-side and on-
line client-side architectures. Those extensions would involve computation of new empirical
distributions for the underlying deduplication system.
6.2.2 Related Work
While other studies have approached the question of reliability in data deduplication, they
tend to assess impact through an assumption that the number of files referencing a dedupli-
cated chunk is directly proportional to the importance of a chunk [5, 16]. While this may be
an appropriate assumption when studying data whose types are largely homogeneous [5, 16],
we believe this provides a limited picture of how deduplication affects fault tolerance on real
systems storing a large amount of heterogeneous data. Moreover, these studies [5, 16] do
not provide a way to quantify the data reliability of a deduplication system.
Our study differs in that it quantitatively analyzes the reliability of a deduplication system
with heterogeneous data and heterogeneous storage hardware. We use our methodology to
provide insight to help meet design goals for reliability while maintaining an improved storage
efficiency over a non-deduplicated system. Our quantitative analysis is performed utilizing
discrete event simulation and by exploiting identified near-independent relationships in the
underlying model to more efficiently solve a complex model in the presence of rare events as
described in [71].
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6.3 Overview of Our Reliability Analysis Methodology
The modeling methodology is composed of two main components: a deduplicated file system
model and a hardware system reliability model. These models are solved using a the methods
discussed in Chapter 5. Given the data to be stored in a deduplicated storage system
and the deduplication algorithm used on the system, including parameters such as chunk
size and similarity measures, we built a model of deduplication in our storage system that
represents the resulting deduplication process. Data in our system are categorized into
different classes based on either known application file extensions or user-specified criteria.
Our deduplication model summarizes the relationships implied by deduplication for each of
these classes. Section 6.4 describes the process by which we characterize data, along with
its application on a real data set.
The reliability model of our hardware makes use of system level configuration information
to build an on-line mathematical representation of our hardware environment. Specifically,
parameters that have more impact on reliability are considered, such as the type of disks
used in our system (nearline or enterprise), RAID type (1, 5, and 6) or erasure codes, the size
of a stripe on our arrays of disks, and the number and configuration of disks in a reliability
group. We model three types of storage-level faults explicitly, including whole disk failure,
latent sector errors, and undetected disk errors. Secondary faults due to deduplication are
deduced via our model of the deduplicated file system. An in-depth discussion of these topics
is provided in Section 6.5.
Given the model of deduplication, the hardware reliability model, and the parameters
of the target system (such as the replication factor and data distribution), our discrete
event simulator provides per-category estimates of expected reliability for our hardware,
deduplicated file system, and parameter sets. Section 6.6 summarizes the results of one such
estimation on several hardware systems using a real-world data set and various deduplication
parameters.
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Figure 6.1: Summary of categories that contain files that share deduplicated chunks with
other categories.
6.4 Deduplicated File System Description and Model
In order to evaluate the effects of data deduplication on fault tolerance in a real system, we
examined the deduplicated data stored in an enterprise backup/archive storage system that
utilizes variable-chunk hashing [72, 73]. Our example is a client/server system that provides
backup and archive solutions for a multi-vendor computer environment that can consist of
file servers, workstations, application servers, and other similar systems. Server-side data
deduplication is used for space management in this system.
We present a general model of the relationships implied by data deduplication, and their
consequences for fault tolerance, based on our analysis of the real system. We also present
refinements to the model necessary to model variable-chunk hashing, as used by the system
represented in our data. In order to demonstrate the flexibility of our model of deduplication,
we will also show how to adapt it for delta encoding.
6.4.1 Data Analysis
The data stored in the system consist of backups from about 150 workstations (the most
common operating system family for workstations in the backup group was Windows, though
MacOS and Linux were also represented), as well as backups of several IBM DB2, Oracle, and
Microsoft SQL database servers and several mail servers, including IBM Lotus Domino and
Microsoft Exchange. The data-set has approximately 7TB of deduplicated data. Without
deduplication, the system would require over 16TB to store all the data. The deduplicated
data have a total of 193,205,876 separate references to 2,870,681 unique data chunks.
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In order to better understand the deduplication relationships implied by our data, we
placed all files on the system into eleven categories based on their file extensions. A total of
2,735,894 unique file names were processed, featuring 55,688 unique file extensions. Of these
file extensions, only 14,910 appeared more than once, and only 1,520 appeared five times or
more. We identified four major categories and eleven subcategories based on file extensions.
• Databases : We specified four categories for files associated with database applications
db2, Oracle, SQL and DBGeneric. We use DBGeneric for those files we know to
be used by a database, but for which the specific database is unknown.
• Mail : We identified two categories of files associated with mail applications: Lotus
Domino and Exchange.
• User Data: We specified four categories for user data files: Archives, Documents,
Media and Code.
• VM : We grouped all virtual machine application data into a single category, VM.
We call our twelfth category Unclassified and use it to hold system files we assume to be
re-creatable from installation media or other sources that make recovery of the data possible,
files whose extensions do not match expected for our previous eleven categories, and those
files with no file extensions.
We do not suggest that these categories are the best or only ways to partition a dedu-
plicated file system. In fact, we assert that the proper way to partition a file system into
categories is context-sensitive and user-specific, based on legal and contractual obligations
as well as administrator goals. Categories should reflect groups of important files or ap-
plications. To understand the relationships that these categories of files shared through
deduplication, we constructed a graph with a set of nodes NI with an element for every
deduplicated chunk in our deduplicated system, and a second set NC with a node for each
category of file defined. When we encountered a reference in the data from a category to
some deduplicated chunk, we added the edge connecting the nodes, allowing duplicate edges.
The weight of an edge is equal to the number of duplicate edges and defines the number of
references to a given deduplicated chunk.
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References per Chunk
Unique Chunks 90th Quantile Maximum
Archive 50,240 24 174,720
Code 895,615 2 105,404
Document 574,222 2 16,128
Exchange 9,288 4 42,442
Lotus 9,790 14 60,216
Media 148,887 4 3,384
MSSQL 16,089 32 280,044
Oracle 30,460 4 21,476
db2 30,810 6 5,194
DBGeneric 20,456 6 77,120
VM 9,328 2 308,934
Unclassified 1,075,851 8 251,542
Table 6.1: Summary of the data obtained from analysis of deduplicated chunks.
Using this graph, we identified 351 chunks with references from exactly two categories,
and two with references from exactly three categories. The remaining 2,870,328 chunks had
references from only one category. Figure 6.1 shows the paths between nodes in NC that
pass through exactly one node in NI and no nodes in NC . It seems likely that the frequent
connections between the unclassified node and other nodes in NC , represented in Figure 6.1,
are indicative of a failure to properly classify files by their extensions, or files with misleading
extensions. In such cases, it seems safest to treat unclassified files that reference chunks that
share an edge with another category Ck as if they are from category Ck. For those nodes
shared between two categories Ci and Cj , where neither is the unclassified category, we
consider the node a legitimate cross category deduplication. For our analysis we treat a
deduplicated chunk as categorized with the highest level of importance of any referring file
or category.
The distribution of references to chunks varied based on which categories were connected
in our graph. Table 6.1 summarizes some of this information by showing the total number
of unique deduplicated chunks with at least one reference to each of the categories, the 90th
quantile for references per chunk for those chunks with at least one reference to a given
category, and the maximum number of references per chunk for those chunks with at least
one reference to a given category.
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6.4.2 Using Category Information to Define Importance
Determining the importance of a file on a deduplicated storage system is a difficult proposi-
tion, and is likely to be dependent on the needs and legal requirements of the organization
operating the storage system. While one could take the approach of keeping additional
copies of all files that have a certain reference count, we suggest that this is a poor measure
of importance, for two primary reasons. First, it assumes that chunks with few references
are less important. While it is true that the loss of a chunk with fewer references will cause
fewer secondary failures due to deduplication, deduplicated chunks fail at the same rate re-
gardless of their reference count, and those chunks with fewer references may be referenced
by critical data whose reliability is just as important as that of files that share a chunk with
many other files. Second, using reference count as a measure of importance can result in a
loss of storage efficiency to increase the reliability of files that are either easily re-creatable
system files, or files unimportant to the organization.
6.4.3 Model of a Deduplicated File System
In order to construct a model of our deduplicated file system for use with our methods from
Chapter 5, we must first develop an empirical understanding of deduplication in a real file
system. We view deduplication on this file system as a dependence relationship and construct
a graph, whose nodes represent files and deduplicated chunks in our file system, to model this
dependence relationship. Each deduplicated chunk in our file system is represented by a node
ni ∈ NI . Files themselves are represented by the set NF = {NF,C1, NF,C2, NF,C3, . . . , NF,C12},
where each subset NF,Ck contains a node nj,Ck for each file fj that is a member of category
Ck. Deduplication relationships are again represented by the set of edges E such that if a
chunk ni is referenced by a file fj in category Ck, an edge nj,Ckni ∈ E.
We suggest using the data summarized in Table 6.1 as an empirical estimate of the prob-
ability density function (pdf) for a random variable representing the number of references
for a chunk in the given category c. Using this pdf, fc(x), we define an inverse distribution
function (idf) F ∗c : (0, 1)→ X , defined for all u ∈ (0, 1) as follows:
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Fc(x) = Pr(X ≤ x) =
∑
t≤x
fc(t) (6.1)
F ∗c (u) = min
x
{x : u < Fc(x)} (6.2)
Using F ∗c (u) and a uniform random variate U , we can generate realizations of the random
variable described by fc(x), allowing us to use our observations summarized in Table 6.1
to synthetically create a deduplication system with the same statistical properties as our
example system. The number of edges connecting to any node ni ∈ NI is defined by first
determining the primary category of files that refer to the chunk, and by using Equation 6.2
to generate a realization of the random variable described by fCk(x).
While our study concerns only data deduplication that uses variable-chunk hashing, it is
a simple matter to adapt this model for delta encoding or whole file hashing. In those cases,
we simply remove the set NI and define edges between elements of NF directly. Then the
edges in the E must be represented as directed edges of the form
→
nfanfb , indicating that
the file nfa depends on nfb. Directed edges are not required for our variable-chunk hashing
representation, as it is implied that the relationship is a dependence of nodes in NF on nodes
in NI .
6.5 Hardware Reliability Models
When modeling hardware, we utilize models of traditional disk failures, LSEs and UDEs.
Traditional disk failures are assumed to be non-transient and unrepairable without drive
replacement. LSEs can be either transient or permanent [9]. It is important to note that
even in the case of a transient LSE, previous study of LSEs has indicated that data stored
in the sector are irrevocably lost, even when the sector can later be read or written to
properly [9]. In our system model, we consider LSEs to be correctable either when the disk
is subsequently rebuilt due to a traditional disk failure, or upon performance of a scrub of the
appropriate disk. UDEs represent silent data corruption on the disk, which is undetectable
by normal means [13, 47, 40]. UWEs are persistent errors that are only detectable during
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a read operation subsequent to the faulty write. We consider UDEs to be correctable when
the disk is rebuilt because of a traditional disk failure, upon performance of a scrub of the
appropriate disk, or when the error is overwritten before being read, although this type of
mitigation produces parity pollution [40].
6.5.1 Disk Model
In order to understand the effect of faults in an example system, we utilize a formal model
of disks in our underlying storage system. Each disk in our system is modeled as a set
of blocks. The state of a block is modeled using the variable block state. This variable
indicates whether the block is in a non-faulty state, or is faulty due to an LSE, UDE, or
total disk failure; those possibilities are represented as 0, 1, 2, or 3, respectively. Each block
model contains events which represent faults, fault propagation, fault mitigation, and repair.
A full representation for a given block is shown in Figure 6.2. The events and state variables
in the model are described in detail in Appendix A. A disk is the collection of all block
models on a disk that share a single disk failure event.
6.5.2 Fault Interactions and Data Loss
It is important to note that the occurrence of a fault within our system does not guarantee
that data loss has occurred. In many cases, the underlying storage system will utilize some
form of fault tolerance, such as RAID. For that reason it is important to separate the
modeling of faults and errors in our model. For the purposes of our model we consider faults
to include traditional disk failure, LSEs and UDEs, and errors to include data loss which
cannot be recovered, and serving corrupted data silently to the user. In general, for a fault
to manifest as a data loss error, we must experience a series of faults within a single RAID
unit. How these faults manifest as errors depends on the ordering of faults and repair actions
in a time line of system events, as shown in Figure 6.3. In the case of RAID 5, a single failure
can usually be tolerated before a data loss event occurs. For RAID 6, two failures can be
tolerated before data loss. UDEs cause a different kind of error, which is largely orthogonal
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Figure 6.2: Block model diagram
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(a) In the case when subsequent fault events arrive to the
system after a mitigation event for all previous faults has been
processed, there is no potential interaction.
tf a tf b tma tmb
Fault A Mitigation BMitigation AFault B
Time
Data Loss
(b) Subsequent faults that arrive to the system before
mitigation events for previous faults have the potential to result
in data loss.
Figure 6.3: Example fault interactions.
to RAID, by silently corrupting data which can then be served to the user.
In order to determine if a combination of primary faults has led to data loss and potentially
a number of secondary faults, we examine the timing of events in a manner similar to the
window of vulnerability method described by [74]. Given a storage system that can tolerate
n faults before data loss occurs, we will see faults manifest as data loss only when the joint
effect of n faults occurs on overlapping portions of disks in the same reliability group before
mitigation. To evaluate that, we utilize the representations of the faults on the disk as
defined in Section 6.5.1.
Faults in the form of traditional disk failures can result in data loss if their arrival times
tf1, tf2 are such that for the time at which the initial fault is mitigated (mf1 > tf2)∧ (mf2 >
tf2). In such a case, the entire drive is lost to the failure.
Traditional disk failures can also result in data loss when combined with a subsequent LSE
on a read operation. Again, given arrival times of the failure events tf1, tf2 and a mitigation
time for the first fault mf1 (mf1 > tf2) ∧ (mf2 > tf2), an LSE on another disk in the RAID
group that corrupts data on the disk before mitigation will result in the rebuilding of an
unrecoverable sector on the disk.
UDEs form a special case of fault. While they can be detected by a scrub operation, repair
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Figure 6.4: DFA representing the combination of faults which lead to data loss on a stripe
from UDEs, LSEs, and traditional failures under RAID1, or RAID5.
is not possible. Scrubbing a disk tells us that an error is present in the stripe, but not where
the error is. An error in the parity or on any of the data drives creates an identical situation
for the scrub.
In order to characterize the interactions of faults in our model, we maintain a state-based
model of portions of the physical disk, as detailed by Section 6.5.1. Given a set of disks that
are grouped into an interdependent array (such as the set of disks in a RAID5 configuration,
or a pair of disks that are mirrored), each stripe in the array maintains its state using a state
machine appropriate to the number of tolerated faults the configuration can sustain without
data loss, such as shown in the example in Figure 6.4.
Each stripe is represented by a tuple (Q,Σ, δ, q0, F ). The set of states Q can be partitioned
into three different subsets; Qgood = {q0}, the fault-free non-degraded state and start state;
Qdegraded = {q1, q2, q3, q4}, states in which the stripe has suffered a fault but no data loss;
and Qfail = F = {q5, q6}, which represent the states that indicate that data have been
lost. When the simulator processes an event for a given stripe, it forwards information on
the processed event to the state machine in the form of the DFAs input alphabet, Σ =
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Figure 6.5: Stripe model diagram
{TF, LSE, UDE,Write, Read, Scrub, Repair}. Each of those symbols represents a fault, a
mitigation, or an action that causes a UDE to serve corrupt data undetectably. The DFA
transitions on these symbols based on the transition relation defined by δ : Q× Σ→ Q.
A DFA of that form is stored for every stripe in a disk group. The state of the DFA
is stored in a state variable called Stripe DFA (as shown in Figure 6.5), which takes on
values {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} to represent the states in Q for our DFA. Each of the symbols in
Σ are events in this stripe model whose enabling conditions are the presence of these faults
in a block in the given stripe on the system. Another state variable, Failure, is set to
1 when Stripe DFA has a value in {5, 6}. The DFAs maintained by stripes within our
modeled system are generated automatically using knowledge of potential fault interactions
and parameters that define the size of the disk array sarray and the number of disk faults
ntolerated faults that the array can tolerate without data loss, as defined by the array’s RAID
level [12].
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Figure 6.6: Example MDG representing deduplication relationships.
6.5.3 Deduplication Model
When modeling the impact of errors in our system, we utilize a model of deduplication
based on the empirical data and analysis from Section 6.4. If a failure of a stripe causes a
deduplicated block to be lost, additional blocks will also be lost if the lost block represented
a stored deduplicated instance. These secondary faults would not have occurred, were it not
for the deduplication strategy used by the storage system. In the case of whole file hashing,
delta encoding, or other deduplication methods that allow for a chain of references, the loss
of a block implies not only the loss of all blocks that reference the data, but also, recursively,
the loss of all blocks associated with files dependent on the reference itself.
We encode those relationships in the model when it is generated as dependence relation-
ships and correlated failures that occur when an underlying block has failed, as shown in
the example in Figure 6.6. In the figure, when the block state state variable shown at the
bottom of the diagram has failed, and the Failure state variable indicates the failure of the
stripe an additional failure of deduplicated references occurs because of the loss of a required
instance. Multi-copy deduplication modifies the underlying model as shown in Figure 6.7.
In that scenario, each deduplicated instance is stored in two blocks, so the failure of both
the two blocks and their associated stripes must occur before the enabling conditions of the
deduplicated failure are met.
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Figure 6.7: Example MDG representing deduplication relationships with 2-copy
deduplication.
These relationships are encoded in the model of a storage system by randomly assigning
each block a category, then based on the category a status as either undeduplicated data,
deduplicated instance, or deduplicated reference as appropriate based on the empirical dis-
tributions we calculated from the data. The appropriate events and dependencies are then
encoded in the model.
6.6 Discrete Event Simulation Results
In order the understand the impact of data deduplication on fault tolerance we simulated
systems with data sets of 7TB (based on the system described in Section 6.4) and 1PB before
deduplication. Both systems are assumed to have a deduplication ratio of 0.5. We modeled
the systems with reliability provided by various RAID and erasure codes, including RAID1
(mirroring), RAID5 in 7 + p and 8 + p configurations, RAID6 in an 8 + 2p configuration,
and erasure codes in an 8 + 3p configuration. For each system we calculated two reliability
measures: the rate at which all copies of a deduplicated chunk were lost, and the rate at
which undetected corrupt data was served to applications.
We make the assumption that our modeled system features a workload of 100 io/s for
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Figure 6.8: Cumulative probability density function of the number of references to each
deduplicated instance for the SQL category.
7 TB
RAID1 RAID5
1 copy 2 copy 1 copy 2 copy
Archive 1.2e+02 ± 6.2e+01 8.6e-10 ± 2.2e-10 1.7e+03 ± 7.1e+02 1.8e-07 ± 2.9e-0
Code 2.9e+03 ± 6.4e+02 2.8e-08 ± 1.3e-09 6.8e+04 ± 3.0e+04 1.5e-05 ± 2.9e-06
db2 3.3e+03 ± 1.6e+03 5.4e-08 ± 1.3e-08 4.1e+04 ± 2.2e+04 8.6e-06 ± 2.5e-06
DBGeneric 6.5e+01 ± 8.5e+01 1.3e-09 ± 2.3e-09 1.9e+02 ± 1.3e+02 1.2e-08 ± 5.5e-09
Document 6.6e+01 ± 1.1e+02 1.3e-09 ± 3.3e-09 2.2e+02 ± 1.1e+02 1.4e-08 ± 3.5e-09
Exchange 4.0e+02 ± 1.5e+02 3.2e-09 ± 4.1e-10 5.6e+03 ± 1.3e+03 6.1e-07 ± 3.3e-08
Lotus 2.4e+01 ± 2.1e+01 1.1e-10 ± 7.6e-11 4.0e+03 ± 5.2e+03 2.8e-06 ± 5.0e-06
Media 1.3e+03 ± 2.6e+03 1.7e-07 ± 6.4e-07 1.3e+03 ± 8.7e+02 1.7e-07 ± 7.2e-08
Oracle 7.2e+01 ± 4.1e+01 7.4e-10 ± 2.4e-10 4.8e+02 ± 2.8e+02 3.3e-08 ± 1.1e-08
SQL 7.2e+01 ± 4.1e+01 4.9e-10 ± 1.6e-10 1.2e+03 ± 6.8e+02 1.3e-07 ± 4.4e-08
Unclassified 4.9e+03 ± 1.5e+03 6.5e-08 ± 6.3e-09 1.6e+05 ± 1.8e+05 7.0e-05 ± 8.4e-05
VM 2.6e+01 ± 2.7e+01 2.1e-10 ± 2.3e-10 2.7e+02 ± 1.1e+02 2.3e-08 ± 4.0e-09
Table 6.2: Estimated rate of file loss per year, for the 7TB system using RAID1 and
RAID5, and a single copy of each deduplicated chunk.
1 PB
RAID1 RAID5
1 copy 2 copy 1 copy 2 copy
Archive 8.2e+03 ± 4.1e+03 5.7e-08 ± 1.5e-08 1.2e+05 ± 4.7e+04 1.2e-05 ± 1.9e-06
Code 2.0e+05 ± 4.3e+04 1.9e-06 ± 8.8e-08 4.6e+06 ± 2.0e+06 1.0e-03 ± 1.9e-04
db2 2.2e+05 ± 1.1e+05 3.6e-06 ± 8.9e-07 2.8e+06 ± 1.5e+06 5.7e-04 ± 1.7e-04
DBGeneric 4.3e+03 ± 5.7e+03 8.7e-08 ± 1.5e-07 1.3e+04 ± 8.9e+03 7.9e-07 ± 3.7e-07
Document 4.4e+03 ± 7.0e+03 8.5e-08 ± 2.2e-07 1.4e+04 ± 7.3e+03 9.1e-07 ± 2.3e-07
Exchange 2.7e+04 ± 9.7e+03 2.1e-07 ± 2.8e-08 3.7e+05 ± 8.7e+04 4.1e-05 ± 2.2e-06
Lotus 1.6e+03 ± 1.4e+03 7.0e-09 ± 5.1e-09 2.6e+05 ± 3.5e+05 1.9e-04 ± 3.3e-04
Media 8.8e+04 ± 1.7e+05 1.1e-05 ± 4.2e-05 8.9e+04 ± 5.8e+04 1.1e-05 ± 4.8e-06
Oracle 4.8e+03 ± 2.7e+03 4.9e-08 ± 1.6e-08 3.2e+04 ± 1.9e+04 2.2e-06 ± 7.5e-07
SQL 4.8e+03 ± 2.7e+03 3.3e-08 ± 1.1e-08 8.0e+04 ± 4.6e+04 8.9e-06 ± 2.9e-06
Unclassified 3.3e+05 ± 1.0e+05 4.4e-06 ± 4.2e-07 1.1e+07 ± 1.2e+07 4.7e-03 ± 5.6e-03
VM 1.7e+03 ± 1.8e+03 1.4e-08 ± 1.5e-08 1.8e+04 ± 7.6e+03 1.5e-06 ± 2.7e-07
Table 6.3: Estimated rate of file loss per year, for the 1PB system using RAID1 and
RAID5, and a single copy of each deduplicated chunk.
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each data disk in the system with reads making up 95% of the workload. Disks themselves
are assumed to be 750GB with 128k strips, with read and write requests simulated only for
those portions of a disk containing data. We assume data is distributed uniformly across
all disks, and that reads and writes are likewise uniformly distributed. We derive the rate
of traditional disk failures from [41], and latent sector errors from [10] using the parameters
given for system A − 1 in the paper. We derive rates for UWEs are the same as described
in [55] for enterprise drives.
Reliability is effected by deduplication in two ways: the incidence and impact of faults.
We found in our simulations, that the incidence of faults is reduced by a factor equal to
the deduplication ratio, due to the reduction in the number of disks required to store the
same data set. The impact, however, of each fault was increased for all categories of data
by a factor larger than the reduction provided by deduplication, resulting in a net decrease
in fault tolerance for all categories of files. The impact of a fault during simulation was
calculated using empirical cumulative probability distributions calculated from the data set.
First the file or files suffering an error were assigned a category randomly, next based on the
category, we randomly determined whether the segment of the file or files lost contained a
deduplicated chunk based again on empirical distributions from our data. Finally, if the file
lost was a deduplicated chunk we generated a random number of references to the chunk,
and assigned them randomly generated locations in the storage system so that in the case
of errors spanning multiple files, a file and adjacent reference were not double counted when
both were lost to the initial error. An example CDF for the number of references to a
deduplicated for files in the SQL category is shown in Figure 6.8.
The rate of permanent data loss due to unrecoverable faults is shown in Tables 6.2 and 6.3
for RAID1 and RAID5. The rate of loss increases for all categories when only a single instance
is kept per deduplicated chunk. For configurations with higher fault tolerance (RAID6 and
8 + 3p erasure codes), we saw no significant decrease in fault tolerance during the expected
lifespan of a typical storage system. Any increase in the impact of data deduplication on
the unrecoverable loss of system data is masked by the low incidence of unrecoverable data
loss during the expected system lifespan in the systems we studied.
The dramatic improvements witnessed when two copies are kept of each deduplicated
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chunk are to do to the circumstances which must occur in order to permanently lose the
data stored in the chunk. In addition to the requisite correlated faults shown in Figure 6.3,
the same situation must occur on the independent storage unit which holds the other copy
of the instance before the first storage unit is restored. When the correlated faults involve a
LSE, the situation becomes even more unlikely, requiring the other copy of the deduplicated
chunk to not only reside on the same disk as the error, but the same stripe.
For those systems which did suffer unrecoverable data loss, we kept a tally of the error
scenarios leading to unrecoverable loss. All witnessed data loss events involved at least one
disk failure. More than 50% also contained a LSE, while less than 2% contained a UWE. The
high proportion of LSEs contributing to unrecoverable data loss stems from the temporal
locality described by [10]. Unrecoverable data loss usually occurred during a campaign of
LSEs coupled with a drive failure in the effected RAID unit (66.9% of the time), or an failure
of two drives in a RAID unit before a rebuild could be accomplished (31.8% of the time).
The decrease in fault tolerance due to data deduplication is easily offset by maintaining
multiple copies of each deduplicated instance. Keeping as few as one additional copy results
in a system more fault tolerant than the original, while still resulting in a mean increase in
storage efficiency for all categories. It is important, however, to ensure additional copies are
kept on separate RAID units to reduce the chance of correlated losses.
Multi-instance data deduplication maintains more than one copy for a distinct data chunk.
It increases the resiliency of the system by orders of magnitude at the cost of increased
space usage. The performance characteristics of such a system, i.e. write characteristics
(data injection) and read characteristics (data reconstruction) are highly dependent on the
architecture of the system, specifically the architecture of the meta-data manager. Un-
like traditional single instance deduplication systems where hash maps or indices maintain
data-signature to data-location mappings, in multi-instance deduplication systems, these
bookkeeping data structures now have to accommodate more complex mappings. Further,
managing (create/use/delete) these complex mappings adds overhead to both the CPU and
IO.
While UWEs did not significantly contribute to unrecoverable data loss, it is important to
remember that they are fail silent, and largely orthogonal to RAID [40, 55]. When a UWE
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data sets of size 7TB and 1PB.
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occurs on a system, it can cause corrupted data to be silently served when requested, before
a disk scrub corrects the error. Figures 6.9a and 6.9d show the difference in the rate of
corrupt data served for three different storage configurations for our 7TB and 1PB systems
respectively for a sample data category. The first bar for each RAID configuration shows the
rate of corrupt data being read for a non-deduplicated system. The second bar, to illustrate
the different effects of incidence and impact, shows the different incidence only. The third
bar shows the full effect of both incidence and impact. While the incidence of corrupt data
is reduced, i.e. the smaller amount of data stored results in a lower number of corrupted
files, the increased number of references results in a higher incidence of corrupted data being
served. Not only are reads to the corrupted file effected, but any read to a referring file will
result in silently serving corrupt data to the user, increasing the overall rate of corrupted
reads to the system due to a UWE.
Again, we find a solution by keeping multiple copies of each deduplicated instance. Figures
6.9b and 6.9d compare the rate of corrupted data being read of deduplicated systems with
a single copy of each instance, to systems which keep two copies for a fraction of all files in
a category. The graph shows the results for keeping two copies for the 1%, 10% and 50% of
files within a category containing the largest number of references. In the case of the SQL
category, this results in large improvements for just the top 1% most referenced files. Figure
6.10 shows similar results for the VM category. While the general trends are the same, it
is useful to note that the results of keeping additional copies is dependent on the category.
Unlike the SQL category, increasing the portion of the category which maintains multiple
copies from 1% to 10% and then again to 50% does not provide a significant reduction in
the rate of corrupt data served, due to a small number of deduplicated instances accounting
for a large number of the references within the category. This highlights the importance of a
detailed analysis, using category information when making assumptions about the underlying
deduplicated system.
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6.7 Conclusions
Our evaluation of the effect of deduplication on our example system leads us to conclude
that deduplication has a net negative impact on reliability, both due to its impact on unre-
coverable data loss, and the impact of silent data corruptions, though the former is easily
countered by using higher level RAID configurations. In both cases, system reliability can
be increased by maintaining additional copies of deduplicated instances, and for the cate-
gories identified in our example system, typically by keeping multiple copies for a very small
percentage of the deduplicated instances in a given category.
Our results emphasize the importance of detailed analysis of deduplicated systems to fully
understand the impact of deduplication on fault tolerance. Even within our example system,
individual categories features very different distributions, resulting in differing behaviors
and trade-offs for multi-copy deduplication. Reliability returns decrease sharply for the VM
category with increased proportions stored as multiple copies, due to the high portion with
only a few references. For the VM category 90% had two or fewer references. Conversely,
only 38% of deduplicated instances in the MSSQL category had two or fewer references.
While data deduplication helps to achieve goals of storage efficiency, its increasing preva-
lence raises legitimate reliability concerns. Given the increased regulatory pressure, and a
desire to meet customer requirements for long-term data integrity, it is important to develop
a further understanding of the reliability consequences of these methods.
For our example system, we show that reliability goals can still be met while maintaining
some of the storage efficiency provided by deduplication by storing multiple copies of a
portion of deduplicated instances. Our methodology could be applied to other systems to
generate similar evaluations, and to evaluate configurations to meet design goals for both
reliability and storage efficiency.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
As storage systems continue to grow in scale and complexity, it becomes more important to
understand how they fail, and the effectiveness of various methods of preventing failure. In
response to the increased amount of data that needs to be stored, and the length of time
the data is expected to be stored, it is likely that new techniques for improving storage
efficiency will continue to be developed Those techniques, like deduplication, are likely to
have complex and potentially adverse effects on the fault tolerance of the underlying storage
systems to which they are applied. Efficient methods for analyzing potential designs, and
their ability to achieve reliability and storage efficiency goals, will grow more important.
To provide system designers with tools to analyze designs, we have presented models of the
current faults affecting modern and next-generation storage systems, and the hardware and
process layers of large-scale deduplicated file systems. We have detailed methods to analyze
dependence relationships in these systems, and methods to exploit patterns that improve
the efficiency of solution methods when applied to these storage systems in fault-tolerance
studies. In this chapter, we briefly review the work we have presented in this dissertation
and describe potential avenues for expansion of our work, before concluding with some final
remarks.
7.1 Contribution Review
We first presented a detailed set of models that can affect modern storage systems, including
a novel model for UDEs. The models were expanded throughout our dissertation to account
for complexities present in large-scale systems, fault interaction, and the ways in which faults
interact with recovery techniques. These models improve our understanding of how complex
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systems fail and provide a rich environment of failures in which to conduct reliability studies.
To provide a methodology for building large-scale models we utilize the idea of component-
based models using data from real systems to extrapolate models of planned systems which
have not yet been built. Those methods allow us to develop a better understanding of
systems being designed by studying the types of components in existing systems, the ways
they interact, and dependence relationships found between components. We explore the
methods by modeling a large-scale, production, clustered file system and the design of its
replacement.
We next presented a method for efficient simulation of large-scale storage systems that
takes advantage of the component-based approach to model individual RAID subsystems
and scale an existing system to the petascale level. To solve large-scale models with many
components quickly through decomposition of our model, our method exploits the regular
structure of that model, the insight that dependence relationships within a RAID system
matter only when faults are present, and the fact that separate RAID systems do not nor-
mally interact.
To expand the utility of our analysis of system interdependence, and our ability to exploit
dependence relationships in reliability models to enable more efficient simulation, we looked
at deduplicated file systems. Deduplication presents us with more complex dependence rela-
tionships that we proposed to study with MDGs, a novel structure for encoding dependence
relationships in storage systems. We presented methods for identifying failure and recovery
actions, along with methods for decomposing models based on their current state, and the
relevance of various identified dependencies to the reward variables defined for our model.
Finally we applied our methods to a large-scale production deduplicated file system. We
presented a novel method for generating models of deduplicated file systems based on em-
pirical data, and used this model, along with a detailed system model, to answer questions
about the impact of deduplication on reliability. We showed for the system analyzed that
deduplication resulted in a net reduction of fault tolerance, and provided a method to achieve
improved reliability by maintaining multiple references for a subset of the system data. In
doing so we showed how to achieve improved reliability, along with improved storage effi-
ciency, even over non-deduplicated systems. Our methods provide more fault coverage than
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RAID systems do, by allowing us to identify UDEs, which are normally orthogonal to RAID.
7.2 Future Work
We have identified three primary avenues of future work. In Section 7.2.1, we discuss plans to
expand existing fault models to allow for solid state storage media, a type of storage medium
for which fault tolerance is poorly understood. In Section 7.2.2, we explain ways to extend
our work to account for the use of deduplication in primary storage applications, and the
unique design challenges that need to be explored to extend our proposed fault-tolerance
methods to this domain. In Section 7.2.3 we discuss methods for using the information
provided by a deduplication server with or without actually deduplicating data to guard
against UDEs and other difficult faults in primary storage systems.
7.2.1 Solid-State Disks
Models for SSD reliability are still in their infancy, but some do exist. Failures in SSDs
are usually modeled as a bit error rate, and more importantly as an uncorrected bit error
rate (UBER). Common sources of errors include program disturb (due to tunneling or hot-
electron injection), quantum noise effects, erratic tunneling, SILC-related data retention,
read disturb, and detrapping-induced retention. These can be broken down into three major
categories: write errors, retention errors, and read-disturb. [75]
A basic type of write error is the program disturb. Program disturb occurs when a cell
becomes unintentionally programmed due to the programming of another cell. Overpro-
gramming due to noise, tunneling, or other reasons is another possibility, causing a cell that
is being programmed to receive an incorrect number of pulses. A cell being programmed
can also suffer from a program disturb in such a way that it results in overprogramming.
[76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84]
Retention errors are caused by stresses outside of the program/erase cycle, and affect the
ability of a cell to retain data over time. Bit errors due to retention problems are usually
related to charge loss, moving from one voltage threshold to another; the primary causes of
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which are stress-induced leakage current (SILC) and detrapping of tunnel-oxide charge that
was trapped during cycling. [85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94]
Read-disturb errors represent errors which occur due to interference during a read opera-
tion. When a cell is read, all deselected wordlines in the block have a voltage applied. This
can disturb bits either through SILC, or through the filling of traps in the tunnel oxide.
[85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94]
Reasonable models for the UBER that results from these effects are given in the literature,
along with information of how they interact. [75] [95]
Failure rates, however, have been shown not to be stationary, and more complex models
are needed to account for the age of NAND memory and how this variable affects RBER.
Distributions of NAND memory age within a storage system are also necessary.
7.2.2 Primary Storage Deduplication
We have shown the application of our methods to archival storage systems, but deduplication
has been increasingly used for primary storage as well. Primary storage adds the challenge
of requiring a much higher standard of performance than archival storage does. In order to
apply our multi-copy deduplication methods to deduplicated primary storage systems, we
would need to use our fault tolerance results to inform a performance model of a primary
storage system to assess the impact of multi-copy deduplication on performance measures
of interest for various systems.
We plan to investigate those systems, and to develop an understanding of the differences
between the underlying models of deduplication-based dependence relationships in primary
storage systems, versus archival systems. Since primary storage tends to be more diverse
than archival storage, it is likely that the deduplication ratio will be lower, potentially
requiring other methods to retain storage efficiency when multi-copy deduplication is used.
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7.2.3 UDE-Tolerant Storage Systems
We have discussed the use of multi-copy deduplication in storage systems to mitigate the
negative impact of deduplication on fault tolerance. However, another potential use of
our methods includes non-deduplicated systems. It is possible to develop a method for
counteracting UDEs that uses the information provided by a deduplication server about
redundancy in a storage system, without completely eliminating that redundancy. UDEs
represent a real challenge as detecting them has traditionally been too expensive, given
their orthogonality to RAID. However, given proper file placement to ensure that redundant
information can be read in parallel, deduplication meta-data could be used to check on read
operations for corrupt, stale, or otherwise incorrect data due to a UDE.
In order to assess the suitability of those methods, we plan to analyze their performance
consequences in the presence of real workloads for both primary and secondary storage, to
assess the reduction in throughput required to perform these checks with enough frequency
to meet reliability goals for data despite the presence of UDEs.
7.3 Concluding Remarks
As storage technology companies continue to expand the horizon of storage technology, it
is critical that we also continue to expand our understanding of the systems in question.
As systems scale-up, faults that once had no noticeable effect become common, and can
threaten the integrity of system data. New technologies that are intended to address certain
customer requirements often have complex effects on other requirements that are not well
understood. Our understanding of the fault environments present in next-generation storage
systems and their complex inter-dependencies needs to keep pace with technology.
Work in this area has often relied on incomplete models of the extant fault environments
and incomplete models of the underlying file relationships in storage systems have led to
incorrect or incomplete conclusions about the effect of the application of deduplication to
storage systems. Our goal at the outset of the research that led to this dissertation was to
develop realistic models based on data from real systems to improve our understanding of
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the fault tolerance characteristics of modern storage systems. That entailed derivation of
new models of emerging faults, models of dependence relationships in the stored data, and
models of the important characteristics of the hardware portions of storage systems.
The models we created proved to be large, and, due to the stiffness of the underlying sys-
tems, difficult to analyze. Our early efforts to decompose simple, non-deduplicated systems,
while successful, lacked the expressiveness to handle complex dependence relationships. We
thus set out to develop methods to analyze those more complex relationships, and exploited
the characteristics we found in reliability models of deduplicated storage systems to improve
the efficiency of our solution methods, which we then applied to a real production system.
That enabled us to improve our understanding of the fault-tolerance properties of modern
systems, and to propose new ways to improve fault-tolerance that has been degraded by
deduplication.
There is still a wide range of unsolved problems in storage modeling. Further models
need to be developed to handle nonmagnetic media, such as SSDs, and newer technologies
on the horizon, such as phase-change memory. As these new types of storage become more
affordable, they will see increased use in production systems. Already, solid-state devices
fulfill the local storage requirements of mobile devices and many laptops. Next-generation
storage systems are already being proposed that integrate magnetic and solid-state storage.
We believe our approach provides practical models and methods to tackle current storage
system design problems, and provides a foundation upon that to develop new research which
has the potential to provide understanding of even more complex systems, allowing system
architects to design, understand, and deploy reliable and efficient storage systems despite
the many challenges inherent in such systems.
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APPENDIX A
EXAMPLE IDENTIFICATION OF
FAULT-DEPENDENT RARE EVENTS
In this appendix, we present the results of the application of our algorithm from Chapter 5
to a model of the state of a block from the system described in Chapter 6.
Figure A.1 shows a partial model of a single block from the system from Chapter 6. Four
state variables are shown in this representation:
• scrub process - A state variable that holds the scrub token, indicating it is available
to initiate a scrub of the disk associated with this block.
• block state - The state of the current block; the value of this state variable indicates
whether the block has suffered from a fault, and the type of the fault.
• parity state - The state of the parity block on another disk in the RAID group,
associated with this block.
• LSE count - A counter that holds a number of LSEs that can affect blocks in proximity
to the current block, should it suffer an initial LSE.
Ten events are also shown in Figure A.1:
• advance scrub - Two events with this label are shown. They serve to move the scrub
token between disks in a loop, as the scrub process examines each disk in the larger
storage system in turn.
• scrub - This event fires only when a scrub-detectable state (LSE or UDE) is present
in block state, and the scrub token is present in scrub process. When firing, it
corrects an LSE or UDE in block state.
LSE_count
∆
block_state
∆
Total Disk Failure
∆
∆ ∆
Φ
Secondary_LSE
Secondary_LSE
∆
Φ
parity_state
∆
write_block
Φ Φ∆ ∆
scrub_processadvance_scrub advance_scrub
Φ
∆ Φ
∆
Φ
∆
Φ
scrub rebuild
Initial_LSE UDE
Figure A.1: Initial block model
• rebuild - This event only fires when block state indicates that the block is part of a
disk that has suffered a whole disk failure. It represents the RAID rebuild action that
corrects the state, and it affects all blocks on the disk.
• write block - This event only fires when block state indicates that a UDE has
occurred, and changes the state of block state and parity state to indicate parity
pollution has occurred.
• Initial LSE - This event represents the occurrence of the first of a series of LSEs on
a given disk, originating in the sector containing the modeled block.
• Secondary LSE - Two events share this label. The first represents secondary LSEs
that occur when LSE count > 0; the second representing a similar action from another
block spatially close to the modeled block.
• UDE - This event represents the occurrence of a UDE in our modeled block.
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LSE_count
∆
block_state
∆
Total Disk Failure
∆
∆ ∆
Φ
Secondary_LSE
Secondary_LSE
∆
Φ
parity_state
∆
write_block
Φ Φ∆ ∆
scrub_processadvance_scrub advance_scrub
Φ
∆ Φ
∆
Φ
∆
Φ
scrub rebuild
R R R
Initial_LSE UDE
Figure A.2: Block model with initial rare events indicated.
• Total Disk Failure - This event represents the failure of the entire disk that contains
the modeled block.
We begin the process by marking those events in our model that are locally rare due to
their rates, in this case Initial LSE, UDE, and Total Disk Failure, as shown in Figure
A.2.
We then process the model using Algorithm 1 and assuming a system with no initial
faults. The first step of the algorithm is to remove all ∆-dependencies from rare events in
ER, shown in Figure A.3.
Next, we mark as constant any state variable whose value can no longer change, except
for the firing of an event in ER. LSE count fits this category, having no remaining ∆-
dependencies, and so is marked constant with a value of 0. Likewise, the equivalent state
variable is also marked constant for the incoming secondary LSEs to our block model. The
result is shown in Figure A.4.
We then remove all Φ-dependencies that cannot be satisfied by the constant marking of
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Figure A.3: Block model, with ∆-dependencies eliminated.
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Figure A.4: Block model with state variables marked constant.
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Figure A.5: Block model with Φ-dependencies removed, and new events labeled in P .
state variables, and take those events whose enabling conditions can no longer be satisfied
and place them in the set P , as shown in Figure A.5.
We repeat the previous step of removing ∆-dependencies from events in P , which we now
add to the set ER, shown in Figure A.6.
Again we mark as constant those state variables whose values can no longer change, in
this case block state, as shown in Figure A.7.
We remove all Φ-dependencies that cannot be satisfied by the constant marking of state
variables, and take those events whose enabling conditions can no longer be satisfied and
place them in the set P , as shown in Figure A.8.
We repeat the previous step of removing ∆-dependencies from events in P , which we now
add to the set ER, as shown in Figure A.9.
At this point no further events can be removed, and the algorithm halts, having identified
our mitigation actions and added them to ER.
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Figure A.6: Block model, with ∆-dependencies eliminated.
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Figure A.7: Block model with state variables marked constant.
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Figure A.8: Block model with Φ-dependencies removed, and new events labeled in P .
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Figure A.9: Final block model with all mitigation actions identified.
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